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Abstract 
 
Title  The Process of Changing the Audit Report in an International Context 
 
Seminar date    2014-06-02 
 
Course    BUSN69 Degree Project – Accounting and Auditing, 15 ECTS credits  
 
Authors    Tina Jönsson and Karin Svensson 
 
Advisors    Amanda Sonnerfeldt and Anne Loft 
 
Five key words   Audit Report, ISA 700, IAASB, IFAC, Regulatory Space 
 
Purpose   In the light of IAASB’s due process and its relatonships with 
international organizations, the purpose of this thesis is to provide an 
understanding of the political process of changing the audit report 
standard and the context in which this takes place. 
 
Methodology  The methodology undertaken is mainly based on a qualitative approach 
to document studies. The research questions have been addressed by a 
document analysis of both primary and secondary sources. A form of 
content analysis of comment letters to the proposed new audit report 
standard is also performed. 
 
Theoretical perspectives The theoretical framework consists of the concept of regulatory space. 
This perspective provides a basis for how to approach the audit report 
changing process, and serves as an analytical tool for analyzing the 
participating actors, their motivations for involvement and the 
interactions and relationships between organizations. 
 .  
Empirical foundation  The empirical findings consist of three parts. The first two chapters 
outline the the history of changes to the audit report as well as the 
development and role of IFAC and IAASB in the international audit 
arena, within a context of other important organizations. The last part 
discusses the current due process of consultation with focus on the 
influence of stakeholders to IAASB’s proposed new audit report rules.  
 
Conclusions  This thesis argues that main actors, consisting of e.g. a group of 
international regulators are active in the shaping of the regulatory space 
and the initiation of regulatory conversations, such as the issue of the 
audit report. It is shown that the IFAC and IAASB act in a context 
consisting of heavily interlocking organizational relationships. Further, it 
is in the process of changing the audit report seen that IAASB needs to 
consider a myriad of different opinions and that not all wishes can be 
fulfilled. Some findings indicate that a few actors are not successful in 
influencing the approach taken in the audit report change. Based on the 
ambiguous findings, it is however not reasonable to distinguish some 
actors as more or less successful than others in influencing the proposed 
rules. 
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1. Introduction  
The primary tool for auditors to communicate with users of financial statements is the audit 
report. The purpose of the audit could be explained by that it fills a function “where there is a 
duty of accountability between two parties…and that an audit is the means by which 
accountability is ensured” (Flint, 1988, p. 12). To improve the degree of confidence of users in 
the financial statements, the auditor expresses an opinion on whether the financial statements are 
prepared in accordance with a financial reporting framework. This opinion is based on whether 
the financial statements present a true and fair view (Adiloğlu & Vuran, 2011) For investors and 
analysts the audit report with its audit opinion is the only distinct source for gaining insight into 
the audit. This makes it an essential document with an important content (MARC, 2009; Porter, 
Simon & Hatherly, 2008).  
 
The content and coverage of the audit report has been subject to discussions over time and have 
sometimes been changed or revised as a response. Even so, the audit report has for a long time 
due to its standardized format and wording been seen as a “uniquely uninformative” and boring 
letter that looks almost the same for every company (Sawers, 2012). This is now all about to 
change. The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), who sets 
international auditing standards (ISAs) has put the change of the audit report as a top priority on 
its agenda and is proposing additions that dramatically changes the content of the audit report 
and the work of auditors. Auditors will now be required to tailor the report to each client and 
provide insights to the audit of the financial statements, such as difficulties with the audit, key 
risks and areas of subjective management judgments (IAASB, 2013). This will change the report 
from being one page to cover several pages. The proposed new rules are by the chairman of 
IAASB itself called “A Game Changer” and “The Beginning of a New Era” (Schilder, 2013). 
 
1.1 Problem Discussion 
As mentioned in the introduction the standard audit report is undergoing major changes. The 
IAASB, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) of the United States (US) 
as well as the European Commission (EC) are all under the process of separately enhancing their 
audit report and finalizing the rules. Something they all have in common is introducing 
requirements for the auditor to provide additional information about the key areas of the audit in 
order to make the audit report more informative (PwC, 2013). There are however different views 
about if it is appropriate for the auditor to provide additional information (see for example 
IOSCO Technical Committee, 2010). 
 
Some calls for change, coming from institutional investors and regulators (IOSCO Technical 
Committee, 2009; ACAP; 2008) have addressed the lack of informative value of the audit report 
and stressed the importance of filling an information gap, namely between what investors and 
analysts believe they need to make investment decisions and what is is publicly available to 
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them. This information gap has arisen from that the financial statements has become more 
complex and long while the disclosures in the audit report has not increased with it. A 
consequence of this information gap is that the investors want to understand what judgments the 
auditor may have done in the process to reach an audit opinion on the financial statements and 
which areas that might have been considered risky. This in turn has led to that the investors want 
more information in the audit report about the insights the auditor has through its audit of the 
entity (ICAA, 2013).  
 
In line with IAASB’s new governance structure and work in the public interest, the due process 
of standard setting now involves collecting views from a broad spectrum of stakeholders. The 
due process of changing the audit report has from 2011-2013 gone through three consultation 
rounds where the public could submit comments to the IAASB and give their opinions and 
suggestions regarding the different proposals. Even if the due process could be seen as a 
comprehensive process undertaken by IAASB to take into account and listen to different 
stakeholders, a due process does not necessarily mean that information gathered affects the 
decision-making of the standard-setter (MacDonald & Richardson, 2004) What can be said about 
a due process is that a particular process is followed and that it is used as a way of legitimizing 
the standard, i.e. the result of the due process (MacDonald & Richardson, 2004). Thereby it is 
interesting to study whether the comments by the respondents to the consultation papers are 
successful in influencing the standard setter’s continued approach, or if some respondents are 
more influential than others.   
  
While many prior studies concerning the audit report focus on how users perceive the audit 
report, the difficulties with it and areas in which it needs to be improved, we find it interesting to 
look at the political process of changing it. This includes looking at the pressures and different 
interests of actors that try to influence the change. A way of doing this is to adopt the lens of the 
regulatory space, which sees regulation as occurring in an abstract space that is occupied by 
major and minor participants that struggle for their benefits (Hancher & Moran, 1989) This 
concept recognizes the complexity of both the standard setting and the agenda formation 
processes and it leads the researcher to the question of who is involved in the regulation process 
and who is inside and outside the regulatory space. By doing that, it is not enough to just 
consider the standard setter, in this case the IAASB, the researcher needs to look outside the 
organizational borders and turn attention to the interaction with different actors and institutions 
that contribute to the processes of change (Young, 1994). Also identifying how regulatory 
arrangements have come to be in the past is important for understanding how the arrangements 
work today (Hancher & Moran, 1989). When studying international audit regulation, researchers 
have pointed towards the important and influential relationship between international regulators, 
the large audit firms and International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (Humphrey, Loft & 
Woods, 2009). This means that it is interesting to study not only the standard changing process 
11 
 
of IAASB and IFAC as if in a vacuum, but how they act in a global context of stakeholders that 
are involved and trying to influence the audit standard setting process as well.  
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
In the light of IAASB’s due process and its relatonships with international organizations, the 
purpose of this thesis is to provide an understanding of the political process of changing the audit 
report standard and the context in which this takes place. 
 
Questions we seek to answer are: 
 
1. Who are the main actors influencing IAASB and how are they participating in the 
regulatory space in which audit report regulation is changing?  
2. In the due process of stakeholder consultation, is it possible to see whether some actors 
are more successful than others in influencing the proposed rules to the new audit report? 
1.3 Position of This Thesis 
In a number of articles from the last decade it has been argued for the growing importance of 
IFAC in the “new financial infrastructure” and the interesting context in which international 
audit regulation occurs (Loft, Humphrey & Turley, 2005; Loft, Humphrey & Woods, 2009; 
Humphrey & Loft, 2009, Humphrey & Loft, 2012; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). In addition to the 
audit profession, international regulators such as the EC, IOSCO and the World Bank have 
managed to gain crucial influence. The nature of the interlocking relationships between those 
regulators, the big audit firms and IFAC are pointed out as useful to study for understanding 
developments within international audit regulation (Humphrey & Loft, 2012). What has not been 
done in the earlier research but makes this study relevant, is that this thesis studies these actors 
and their relationships with the aim of contributing to an understanding of how a particular 
standard setting case is influenced. In addition, this thesis contributes by investigating the 
potential influence on the standard setting process of other stakeholder groups than the 
international regulators and the big audit firms, such as investors, preparers, national standard 
setters and others.  
 
The standard setting case that is in focus of this thesis is the changing of the standard audit 
report. The issue of improving audit reporting has become the most important and prioritized 
issue of IFAC’s standard setting board IAASB (IFAC, 2014a). Thus while earlier research has 
focused on IFAC and the embedded organizations and their role in the financial infrastructure, 
this thesis studies the role of these actors and other stakeholder groups that are affected by and 
have an interest in the audit report development. This is studied to see if and how they have an 
influence on the approach taken by the IAASB. 
 
By using the concept of regulatory space we add new understanding to the context around IFAC 
and IAASB and how the major and minor actors in this regulatory space contributes to the case 
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of audit report change, both in how it emerged as an issue and the way it develops. By not only 
studying the changing process alone, we concur with requests for looking at auditing with in its 
context in the international financial architecture (Humphrey, Loft & Woods, 2009).  
1.4 Delimitations 
The scope of this thesis involves IAASB’s process of changing its standard unqualified audit 
report as dealt with in ISA 700 “Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements” 
which subsequently involves a new additional standard – ISA 701 “Communicating Key Audit 
Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report”. When addressing the second research question, a 
focus on the development of the new proposed section of Key Audit Matters is made. The 
mentioned two standards are also the main focus of the IAASB in its project to improve auditor 
reporting. Studying this process includes looking at involvement and interests of other actors, 
however not all actors within the regulatory space can be covered. This thesis focuses on the 
international organizations that are part of IFAC’s and IAASB’s formal governance structure as 
well as sample of respondents to the IAASB’s audit report consultation process.  
 
Also time limitations apply to the scope of this thesis. In order to provide a basis for IFAC’s role 
in the global audit arena and the construction of this regulatory space in which we put IFAC in 
the center, we provide an historical perspective from the time when IFAC was established. 
However focus is primarily on the time period after the turn of the century, which started with 
corporate scandals that triggered criticism of auditors and later involved a global finance crisis 
that also put pressure for audit change.  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
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2. Methodology 
 
In this chapter the overall research approach and methods are explained. The approaches to 
data gathering and selection of focus area and comment letter respondents are described in 
more detail, as well as some issues regarding ethics, reliability and validity.  
 
2.1 Approach to Research 
To fulfill the purpose of this thesis, which is to provide an understanding of the political process 
of changing the audit report standard, a generally qualitative research approach has been taken, 
which for instance means that we try to look for patterns and explanations in the empirical data 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). Qualitative research often implies the need for understanding the context 
around the object of the research, as well recognizing processes over time in that for instance an 
organization’s history influences the way that the organization is today (Bryman & Bell, 2013). 
This aligns with the purpose of our thesis and our choice of theoretical framework which also 
emphasizes the need for understanding regulation in its context of political and legal settings, 
participating actors and historical timing (Hancher & Moran, 1989). As opposed to quantitative 
research where looking for prediction and generalization of findings is usual, qualitative 
research, like the approach of this thesis, seeks illumination and understanding (Golafshani, 
2003).  
 
Our research process started with establishing the governance structure around IFAC and IAASB 
and subsequently identifying major actors and their interest and involvement in audit regulation 
in general as well as the specific case of the audit report. To be able to understand the audit 
report change of IAASB and the possible involvement of actors, the emergence and development 
of the current audit report was considered. All this provided a basis for addressing the second 
research question of investigating if certain actors are more successful than others in influencing 
the rules to the audit report.  In approaching this question, a form of content analysis of comment 
letters was conducted. The comment letters were compared to IAASB’s proposals to see which 
actors got their views incorporated into IAASB’s proposed rules or not. A more thorough 
discussion on the process of addressing the two research questions is presented further in this 
chapter. 
 
In addressing the two research questions we performed document analysis of official textual 
documents of both primary and secondary sources. These we understand as constructed in a 
certain contexts, by certain persons and organizations that have certain purposes with these 
documents. This is particularly relevant to for instance meeting minutes of organizations and the 
comment letters that were submitted to IAASB during its consultation processes (Mason, 2002). 
Comment letters can be seen as primary sources, since what we want to study is the public 
opinions and discussions of a particular respondent, to which the comment letter is a primary 
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source. Reports from organizations and journal articles can be considered as secondary sources, 
since they summarize and analyze the discussion of others (IUB, 2010).  
 
Through the work on this thesis, our roles as researchers have been “outsiders” (Ryan, Scapens 
& Theobald, 2002, p. 152). This implies that we only used secondary data that is publicly 
available, such as published journal articles, meeting minutes, reports, comment letters and web 
site information, which put us distant from our study object. However as we read, understand and 
interpret documents such as comment letters, it cannot be avoided that we as researchers also are 
a small part of the construction. (Mason, 2002). We have chosen not to collect primary data, 
through for instance conducting interviews or surveys (IWH, 2008), for a number of reasons. 
One of them is that the object of our study is a very transparent process and therefore the 
information needed was already available to us. As the research process progressed we 
sometimes thought it would be interesting to ask some follow up questions to for example some 
of the major organizations surrounding IAASB or ask IAASB about their perception of the major 
actors we identified. However, due to time constraints this was not suiting, and further it was not 
of vital importance for continued research since we focused on formal influence rather than 
informal.  
 
In our research we used qualitative data, which in addition to examining a limited number of 
comment letters means that we only draw conclusions on these respondents that we have studied. 
(Rienecker & Stray Jorgensen, 2011) Something that differ qualitative and quantitative data is 
that a quantitative analysis is always made after all data has been collected. Qualitative analysis 
on the other hand, can be characterized by interaction between data gathering and analysis 
(Bryman& Bell, 2013). This was also part of the process in which this thesis has emerged. After 
some of the data had been collected, we started analyzing, even if just in thought, and this in turn 
affected the next steps in data gathering. This means that our strategy for analysis is iterative in 
nature (Bryman& Bell, 2013). This was particularly relevant for the comment letter analysis, 
where the codification and information collection was refined along the way. 
 
2.2 Connection between Theory, Analysis and Data 
We use our chosen theoretical framework as guidance for how to approach the purpose of the 
thesis, by adopting a wide lens for studying the regulatory space while at the same time focusing 
on the relationships of dominant organizations, as the concept suggests (Hancher & Moran, 
1989). We also apply the concept of the regulatory space in the analysis in order to make sense 
of and explain our empirical data. The data was gathered from both a form of content analysis of 
comment letters and a document study of various research studies, reports, meeting minutes and 
website information.  
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2.3 Approach to Research Question 1 
To address the first research question we needed to establish boundaries for which actors, 
considered major, that we would focus upon. Our first step was establishing the structure around 
IAASB and IFAC. In this structure, the members of the IFAC’s Monitoring Group, i.e. BCBS, 
the EC, FSB, IAIS, IFIAR, IOSCO and the World Bank, as well as the large international 
networks of audit firms have important roles. These are also the actors that are titled as key 
players within audit regulation or as parts of influential groupings useful to focus research on 
(Humphrey, Loft & Woods, 2009; Humphrey & Loft, 2012). Therefore these organizations and 
their interest in international audit regulation as well as the current audit report change are 
discussed more in depth than others. While researching on these organizations, important 
connections to the US were found. Because of that, and due to the simultaneous audit report 
changing projects in the US and by the EC, the audit report discussions in these jurisdictions are 
also highlighted. From earlier research on the regulatory space it is mentioned how regulation at 
one place is influenced by happenings elsewhere and therefore it is important to consider the 
parallel audit report changes (Young, 1994). While focusing on these organizations and 
jurisdictions, we do not aim to exclude other organizations or imply that all others are irrelevant.  
 
2.3.1 Data Collection to Research Question 1  
While collecting information about these organizations, we (1) searched their website for 
information about auditing or audit reports, (2) searched via Business Source Complete and 
Google with search words like the “organization name + audit”, (3) established if the 
organization had submitted any comment letters to the IAASB proposals on new audit report 
rules or/ and, (4) searched through IAASB’s meeting material to learn if the organization 
engages in other outreach activities with IAASB. This data collection was an ongoing process 
throughout the work with the thesis. Due to this, and also with assistance from Humphrey and 
Lofts earlier research, we obtained a picture of the organizations’ overall interest or involvement 
in auditing and audit reporting and discussed such recent information.  
 
Meeting minutes and meeting material regarding the audit report from IAASB’s website from 
2009-2014 have also been read, to investigate which stakeholders they say they listen to or take 
input from other than from the comment letters. This helped us grasp the width of IAASB’s 
outreach activities. All sources used are secondary and mainly consist of journal articles on the 
above mentioned research, the organization’s web site information and reports or other type of 
documents published by the main organizations. 
2.4 Approach to Research Question 2 
To address the second research question, which asks if it is possible to see whether some actors 
are more successful than others in influencing the rules to the new audit report, we analyzed 
responses to IAASB’s proposals for change in form of comment letters. The IAASB asked for 
feedback and comments in this way at three occasions: to their Consultation Paper (CP) in 2011, 
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to their Invitation to Comment (ITC) in 2012 and to their Exposure Draft (ED) in 2013, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. Our analysis of interests in regards to this research question is therefore 
also limited to the content of these comment letters and to the actors that used this opportunity to 
respond to IAASB. The research of the comment letters is limited to the ones submitted to the 
CP and the ITC because the time frame of the thesis is from the CP to the suggested ED. Even if 
it would be interesting to see the responses to the ED it does not contribute to the thesis, as it is 
not possible to see if these are incorporated since the final standard is not decided upon yet. 
 
Figure 1: The Different Consultation Papers 
 
We do not look at all interactions between IAASB and the different actors within the regulatory 
space, but limit the empirical data to the submission of comment letters. However, as explained 
before, some key actors in the governance structure of IFAC are discussed more in detail. 
Limitations with just considering comment letters for other stakeholder groups are that other 
possibly important factors that might influence the regulatory space related to the change of the 
audit report are missed. A consequence of this is that it might be difficult to say which actors 
being included and excluded in this space. Examples of relevant events that could be missed are 
formal and informal meetings and conversations between IAASB and its stakeholders. Both the 
organizations we identify as key actors and the other actors that are responding with comment 
letters could have significant importance in the process that we might exclude. 
 
Earlier research has however shown that submissions to exposure drafts are an important part for 
different stakeholders to raise their voices. Submissions on exposure drafts are the most visible 
form of lobbying and it is highlighted that responding to exposure drafts “...provide respondents 
with a means of influence and persuasion” (Stenka & Taylor, 2011, p.110; Tutticci, Dunstan and 
Holmes, 1994). Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes (1994) analyzed submissions to an exposure draft 
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by the Australian Accounting Standard setter to give an understanding of the Australian standard 
setting process.  The authors point out that in the due process of standard setting lobbying is an 
integral part and could either be through formal or informal channels. Submissions to and 
membership of the standard-setting board are examples of formal lobbying while the informal 
could include telephone conversations and other more daily conversations. Obtaining evidence 
from the formal lobbying activities is easier than the informal and many earlier studies on 
lobbying have therefore focused on the submissions to exposure drafts (Tutticci, Dunstan & 
Holmes, 1994). Comment letters are a formal, and therefore visible, lobbying activity for 
stakeholder’s interest and therefore considered relevant in this thesis to understand how different 
actors try to occupy the regulatory space of the standard setting process of IAASB. 
2.4.1 Selection of Focus Area  
The proposed changes to the current audit report included both changes to the format, wording 
and new elements, such as the sections of Key Audit Matter, Going Concern and the 
Engagement Partner’s name. Among the different proposals in the development of the new audit 
report, ISA 701 “Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor's Report” is 
considered to be the most relevant and significant change to the new audit report. IAASB pointed 
out that “the communication of key audit matters in accordance with proposed ISA 701 
represents a particularly significant change in practice” (IAASB, 2013, p. 10). Before the final 
decision to focus on investigating just opinions regarding Key Audit Matters other proposals 
were also considered. The new Going Concern section is also much debated, but rather due to its 
connection to IFRS and the preparing of financial statements. We do not consider the Going 
Concern commentary as such a dramatic change to audit practice as the new section of Key 
Audit Matters. Because the different proposals and standards are complex and very detailed it 
was been considered that one focus area is more beneficial for our analysis. In the first phase of 
this thesis several comment letters were read in order to achieve an overview over the most 
relevant discussions. The introduction of an expanded audit report with an additional audit 
commentary was one of the most discussed matters with different opinions and therefore seen as 
an interesting choice of focus area.  
 
Limitations with the focused investigation are that some aspects of the change of the content in 
the audit report will be left out, and therefore some influencing actors might not be noticed. Or 
the opposite, some of the respondents that seem to be influential might not be that in other areas. 
Still, we argue that investigating one area as the regulatory issue contributes to an understanding 
of and illustrate how some actors “get their way” and some are left out, which could be 
indicative of how these actors influenced the whole audit report change. At least it would provide 
a picture of who or which groups were active and successful in trying to influence the regulatory 
space when it comes to developing a significant change in auditing practice, e.g. the new 
requirement of Key Audit Matters. 
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2.4.2 Content Analysis 
To analyze comment letters we use a form of content analysis based approach. Content analysis 
has been described as a “research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences 
from text. These inferences are about the sender(s) of the message, the message itself, or the 
audience of the message” (cited in Maglio, 2011, p.4). Many prior researchers studying comment 
letters to standard drafts use different kinds of content analysis (Yen, Hirst & Hopkins, 2007; 
Tutticci, Dunstan & Holmes, 2004). An advantage with content analysis is that it enables 
research by organizing texts into convenient parts. However, a disadvantage is that it is time 
consuming to create a coding system that makes sure that the research is reliable and 
reproducible (Yen, Hirst & Hopkins, 2007). We have experienced both these characteristics 
when analyzing the comment letters. 
 
According to Smith and Taffler (2000) and Yen, Hirst and Hopkins (2007) there are two 
common kinds of approaches to content analysis. One is a quantitative analysis also called “form 
oriented” and that consists of routinely counting words or references. The other form is a 
“meaning oriented” or qualitative analysis that involves analyzing underlying themes and 
meanings in the text. The first form has the benefit of being more objective, while the second has 
the benefit of enabling deeper and fuller understanding of the analyzed text (Yen, Hirst and 
Hopkins, 2007). As a form of content analysis, we focused on the manifest meaning while 
reading the comment letters, thereby being close to the former kind of approach. This means that 
we concentrated on the literal meaning of the respondents’ arguments as opposed to trying to 
interpret hidden meanings. However we recognize that it may not be possible to find only the 
literal meaning, since the researcher influences with the own interpretation and the way that it is 
read (Mason, 2002, p. 149).  
 
Our overall approach when analyzing comment letters was first to gain a deep understanding of 
IAASB’s proposals in the CP, ITC and ED that represent the different stages of the consultation 
process. While subsequently reading comment letters, we tried to identify aspects that the 
respondents promoted, which were not incorporated into the next proposal by IAASB, or matters 
which the respondents promoted which were later incorporated in IAASB’s next proposal. The 
categories in which we coded the responses were determined after reading a sample of comment 
letters, and were slightly modified if needed during the process. Thereby our approach to content 
analysis is not only similar to the quantitative explained above. The five overall questions we 
sought to answer by reading comment letters are provided in Appendix 1. The compilation was 
made in an Excel spreadsheet and to each question we also added a commentary section, to 
include the respondent’s argument for the matter in question. The length of the individual 
comment letters varied from one page to 44 pages, which suggests that the amount of issues and 
the depth of issues discussed, varies greatly between respondents. 
 
20 
 
A more quantitative approach to content analysis could possibly also have suited this thesis. 
However, we chose a more qualitative approach after making a pilot test of analyzing comment 
letters, in which we found that the ambiguity of answers and issues needed to be interpreted with 
a more holistic and contextual understanding and also by sometimes forming an understanding of 
both the CP and ITC comment letter submitted by the same organization. In addition, it is not 
primarily the aim of this comment letter analysis to generalize the findings to the whole 
population of respondents, but rather to analyze the possible influence of individual or small 
group of actors.  
 
2.4.3 Selection of Respondents 
As the number of comment letters was very high, 82 to the CP and 165 to the ITC, we decided to 
limit our analysis to a smaller amount of responses. All comment letters are available from 
IFAC’s website (IFAC, 2014b; IFAC 2014c) When choosing a sample it also means that another 
selection could have been done and therefore is it important to consider if the choice of sample is 
relevant for the research question. The sample and selections reflect important strategic choices 
for the researcher to be able to answer the research question (Mason, 2002). This has been 
considered in the choice of our respondents. We believe that looking at a smaller number of 
respondents has some benefits, such as enabling analysis on an actor level and a more in-depth 
consideration of views. It would certainly be interesting to include all respondents’ views and 
compare to IAASB’s proposals to see which actors or arguments are incorporated. However, 
since we don’t primarily aim to investigate if the respondents categorized in the same 
stakeholder group hold the same views for a generalizable purpose we believe that our selection, 
described more below, will nonetheless illustrate an interesting picture and fulfil our purpose and 
research question.  
 
While doing the selection, a representative sample was sought while at the same time not 
wanting to exclude actors that the literature review and context research had suggested as 
important or influential, e.g. respondents from certain organization or countries. The selection of 
the respondents to IAASB’s CP and ITC was therefore made in several steps. First, a 
categorization of respondents was adopted from IAASB who sorted in respondents in 10 main 
groups
1
. This sorting was primarily made in order to ensure that our selection consists of 
respondents from different kinds of stakeholders, with different missions and perhaps different 
interests to look after. This is considered important for analyzing participating actors in the 
regulatory space. Among the different stated stakeholder groups from IAASB two were excluded 
in the selection, namely Academics and Individuals. These two groups were considered at the 
beginning of our research but since it is stated from earlier studies on regulatory space that 
individuals, if not associated with an organization, seldom occupy the space it was decided to not 
                                               
1
 Investors and Analysts, Those Charge With Governance, Regulators and Oversight Authorities, National Auditing 
Standard Setters, Accounting Firms, Public Sector Organizations, Preparers of Financial Statements, Member 
Bodies and Other Professional Organizations, Academics, Individuals and Others. 
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include these (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Young, 1994). It would possibly be interesting to test if 
these stakeholders are influence in this particular regulatory space, but because of limited time it 
was decided to focus on the multiple types of organizations and associations instead. 
 
Since not all the respondents submitted comment letters to both CP and ITC the selection was 
based on the respondents from ITC. In the ITC the Auditor Commentary was developed to a 
relatively more specific concept and it was therefore considered to be the most appropriate basis 
for selecting respondents. The selection of respondents to the ITC was based on both a conscious 
choice and a random selection. The conscious choice was first based on key players that are 
described in section 2.3 in this chapter. It was also noticed that while investigating the context 
around IAASB and parallel audit report changes in the world, that the UK recently changed their 
audit report standard and that the US and the EC has the audit report on their agenda. To avoid 
the risk of excluding actors from these jurisdictions through a completely random selection, a 
second conscious choice was made. This was made from actors that we wanted to include in our 
analysis, due to their size or their connection to a large country. These were European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA), Financial Reporting Council – UK (UK FRC), Fédération des 
Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), Institut der Wirtschaftsprufer (IDW), Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW) and Center for Audit Quality (CAQ). The rest of our respondents were a 
random sample where we made sure to include respondents from each stakeholder group.  An 
overview over the selected respondents is shown in Appendix 2, where the identified key players 
are made bold and the respondents from the second conscious sample are marked with an 
asterisk. In total, 41 respondents were chosen, and due to that all of them did not answer to both 
CP and ITC it was a total of 68 comments letters in this thesis sample. 
2.4.4 Empirical Presentation 
In the empirical section 6.5, we chose to highlight the views of certain stakeholder groups. 
Investors and analysts as well as preparers were chosen due to (1) them being part in the 
financial reporting supply chain (IFAC, 2014d), (2) they having relatively uniform views within 
the groups, and very opposing views between the groups. The Big Four audit firms and the 
regulators and oversight bodies were highlighted since they were in the previous empirical 
chapter identified as the key, powerful players in the audit regulatory arena, as well as part of the 
IFAC structure. The other actors are not highlighted as part of their initial category, but 
individually when views to selected issues are presented. 
2.5 Reliability and Validity 
The external reliability stands for whether or not and to which degree a study can be replicated.  
This criterion has been considered difficult to reach within a qualitative research due to 
qualitative research’s study of social settings (Bryman & Bell, 2011). When it comes to the 
external reliability it is important to consider the possibility for an independent researcher to find 
the same conclusions in the same or similar context. The internal reliability stands for whether 
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another independent researcher that would be given the same generated constructs and data 
would have used them in the same way as we have done in this thesis (Thyer, 2001).  To increase 
both the external and internal reliability in this thesis, we aim to describe as explicit as possible 
how we used the theoretical framework of regulatory space, how our empirical data was gathered 
and how selections were made. One way to increase the reliability in the qualitative research and 
decrease the inherent risk of judgment errors is to do cross-checking (Thyer, 2001). Since the 
coding process of the comment letters and how we interpret the responses was considered to be 
must crucial for the reliability, the cross-checking method was used. The analysis process 
involved that both of us separately interpreted comment letters. Therefore after a certain stages 
we compared our results and evaluated our methods to be able to make a more reliable 
evaluation and interpretation of the respondents’ opinions.  
 
The concept of validity within the qualitative research could also be explained by the degree of 
credibility and therefore focus on the truthfulness of the study. To reach an internal validity it is 
important that the researchers’ observations and measurements give a truthful picture of reality. 
The researcher need to consider if what has been observed or measured is consistent with what 
the researcher believe it is observing and measuring (Thyer, 2011). The internal validity to the 
first research question is considered to be rather high. This is due to that the empirical data builds 
upon a rather systematic examination of data from both the investigated organizations view and 
what other researchers have concluded regarding the position of these organizations in the 
international financial infrastructure. The truthfulness is also considered high due to transparency 
of processes and how relationships were possible to follow through several available documents 
from different sources.  
 
The internal validity in the second research questions was more critical with the risk of 
researcher biases (Thyer, 2011).  It is possible that the first question and the findings affected the 
way we interpreted the comment letters of the identified main actors. When it comes to the 
external validity is it also seen as higher related to the first question and even if we study a 
specific process, the audit report change, the conclusions on major actors and their involvement 
are considered to be rather generalizable to other settings, such as other standard setting 
processes of IAASB. Since the analysis of data for the second question was very dependent on 
the sample it is not considered being appropriate to generalize the findings to other social 
settings.  
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
When conducting research, ethical considerations are important to reflect upon (Bryman & Bell, 
2013). Main considerations are usually relevant when using individual persons in the research 
and how these are approached and treated during the research and in the report. However this is 
not so relevant for our research, which is based solely on data that is publicly available and that 
also was produced with the knowledge and the purpose of being publicly available, such as 
reports, comment letters and meeting minutes. As a part of our ethical considerations, we instead 
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had a certain approach when reading comment letters to try and answer our predetermined 
questions. This involved not merely searching for key words in the responses, but to read the 
responses thoroughly to gain a holistic and overall understanding of the views presented, in order 
to not take a statement out of its context. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the qualitative research approach of this thesis and how the research 
questions have been addressed by a document analysis of both primary and secondary sources. 
The choices regarding methods, selection of focus area, selection of comment letter respondents 
as well as advantages and disadvantages with content analysis have been presented. Our 
reflections and measures regarding reliability, validity and ethics have also been presented 
briefly.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter presents the choice of theoretical framework, namely the concept of regulatory 
space. The concept is introduced and an explanation of how it is applied in this thesis is given. It 
will subsequently be presented how the concept is used in some earlier research studies. Based 
on these studies an analytical framework is developed. 
3.1 The Concept of Regulatory Space  
The regulatory space metaphor is used by several authors in their research (for example Hancher 
& Moran, 1989; Young, 1994; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Jonnergård 2012; McDonald & 
Richardson, 2004; Jonnergård & Larsson, 2007) to get a wider understanding of the actors within 
a regulation process and their interaction and position of power. The concept was developed by 
Hancher and Moran (1989) as a result of making sense to existing findings in the area of 
economic regulation and to provide a new framework to understand regulation.  
 
In this study, we explore the auditing regulatory space at what can be called the “societal level”, 
where the subjects of public regulation are audit firms and where the public interest in regulation 
lies with believing audits are important for the financial markets (Jonnergård, 2012, p. 53). 
Regulatory spaces of today are described as having rather delicate negotiated borders, which are 
influenced by a variety of interests and players (Malsch & Gendron, 2011). The concept of 
regulatory space is said to be “particularly appropriate for examining changes or renegotiations 
of rules within an existing regulatory arena“, which this thesis does by focusing on changes to 
rules of auditor reporting at the international level(Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013,  p. 172). It can 
also be used to study regulatory processes and how regulatory space is constructed and 
reconstructed through time, with the entrance and exit of different actors (MacDonald & 
Richardson, 2004). 
 
3.2 Use of Theory 
For this thesis, the chosen theoretical framework of regulatory space provides guidance on how 
to approach the change of the audit report, by suggesting looking at the actors, their motivations 
for involvement, interactions and relationships between private and public organizations. To 
make sense of our empirical material of the major actors surrounding IAASB, this audit report 
change and how it has emerged, which involves multiple actors with different missions, we apply 
the concept of regulatory space in our analysis. Doing this enables us to think of the actors as 
competing forces for space and power, and draw conclusions on which the possibly influential 
actors are within this space. The regulatory space metaphor hence gives the terms and 
expressions that can help explain the interaction, relationships and activities found in the 
empirical data. However, as Young (1994) mention, interests of actors is not the only thing that 
explains the actions of them, and just because they are members of a specific category doesn’t 
mean that they automatically have the interest of that category. Interests are rather constructed 
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and reconstructed depending on the situation. In this thesis, audit report change is seen as 
happening in a space constructed by organizations and actors that attempt to influence audit 
regulation  
 
3.3 Regulatory Space as defined by Hancher and Moran 
Hancher and Moran (1989, p.271) focused on the economic regulation under advanced 
capitalism and mapped out some distinctive features to explain how the character of  regulatory 
activity was shaped to further suggest that regulation could be best understood by using the 
concept of regulatory space. The regulatory space “...is defined by the range of regulatory issues 
subject to public decision” (Hancher & Moran, 1989, p. 277) and among the features that 
influence the shape of the regulatory space and how the power is distributed, are national 
political, and legal setting, organizational structure, historical timing, the character of markets 
and the nature of issue arenas explained (Hancher & Moran, 1989).  
 
Regulation could be understood by seeing it in the context of being a defining feature of any 
system of social organization, thus the existence of a social order is characterized by the presence 
of rules as well as the attempt to enforce those. Some core activities are constant in the process 
of regulation and according to Hancher and Moran it “involves the design of general rules, the 
creation of institutions responsible for their implementation, the clarification of the exact 
meaning of a general rule in particular circumstances and the enforcement of the rule in those 
circumstances” (1989, p.271). In the space there is a constantly forming and reforming with 
change of allocation of roles between rule makers, enforcers and bearers of specific interests and 
no public-private divide is made Hancher and Moran (1989, p. 276). This in turn leads to that the 
economic regulation under advanced capitalism is best seen from the perspective of a sphere 
with activities where the public and private are mixed and dominated by powerful actors. To 
understand the nature of activities that occurs in economic regulation, one need to consider who 
participates in and benefits from regulation as well as the relationships to be able to understand 
the regulation activities. (Hancher & Moran, 1989) 
 
The authors point out some consequences of the use of the concept of regulatory space. For 
instance, since it is a space, it is available for occupation and can be unevenly divided between 
actors, suggesting there will be more significant and less significant occupants. The regulatory 
space includes a variety of regulatory issues where its occupants struggle for their benefits. To 
get a deeper understanding of the concept these struggles could be examined to understand the 
interaction and distribution of the power within the regulation process. However, the authors also 
point out that examining who has power in the regulation process by studying the relations 
within the space leads to another important aspect, namely that in the process there are also 
actors that are excluded (Hancher & Moran, 1989).  
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According to Hancher and Moran (1989), understanding who is inside and who is outside is a 
vital process and could be done by examining how the organizational relationships look in a 
specific regulatory space. Like various groups could be organized into or out of a regulatory 
space the same applies to various issues. What kind of issue that is in the regulatory space 
depends on what is seen as “regulatable” (Hancher & Moran, 1989, p.278), which in turn could 
be explained by factors such as history, culture, existing resources and the power relationships of 
the actors in the regulatory space. Also, to understand the current regulatory arrangements, it is 
crucial to be aware of the historical context in which it developed. Still, the factors that 
determine the shape of the space and how it is occupied are both many and complex.  
 
Historical timing plays an important role in the regulatory space. First of all the timing reflects 
one basic feature of regulation as an activity. The activity of regulation needs to be organized 
and therefore there is also a need for proper institutional arrangement that in turn requires some 
resources. The organizations that control the right resources will be able to dominate the 
regulatory space and this combined with the initial historical moment of a change will give the 
organization a good opportunity to get a continuously dominant influence. Furthermore, the 
timing aspect symbolizes the nature of regulation where crises often result in a change or search 
for alternative institutional planning (Hancher & Moran, 1989). 
 
Even if it is emphasized that the regulatory space is shaped by how regulation takes place in 
particular places and particular times there is another factor that Hancher and Moran (1989, p. 
286) stress, namely how this space is dominated by organizations. Among these big 
organizations are the largest firms, representative associations, regulatory agencies and central 
departments of the state. The authors mean that economic regulation is basically regulation by 
and through organizations, and the activities of regulation will be affected by who or what 
exercises any power in the regulatory process. The importance of organizations is explained by 
the view of private citizens as “takers” of private regulation while the organizations are the 
makers and shapers.  It is seldom that a private citizen succeeds to gain power within the 
regulatory space if not as a part of an organization. Regardless if the organizations that dominate 
the regulatory space are seen as private or public, some typical characteristics can be identified. 
In addition to that the organizations dominating the space often are big they also are 
characterized of highly structured internal division of administrative labor and administrative 
hierarchies. For a regulation to be completed within a regulatory space with dominating, large 
and hierarchical organizations there is a need for cooperation and therefore the regulation is 
practically never a result of a single individual or simple organization. The main point therefore, 
is that the most important relationships in economic regulation are the ones between the 
organizations. These important occupants in the regulatory space will be best understood through 
the view of their relations of exchange and interdependence (Hancher & Moran, 1989) 
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3.4 Young: “Outlining Regulatory Space…” 
Young (1994) uses the regulatory space perspective to explore the processes through which 
changes in financial accounting practices occur or fail to occur. Three different accounting issues 
were examined within the agenda of Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB. The 
decisions of FASB are explained by Young to be embedded in social and historical contexts and 
accounting change is related to events taking place elsewhere. Further it is explained that FASB 
operates within a complex institutional nexus located between accounting profession and the 
state. Young use the regulatory space in her research as an abstract conceptual space to explain 
how changes in recognition and measurement practices of financial accounting occur. She sees 
the space as as constructed by people, organizations and events related to accounting and 
accounting practices. Further, it is in this space that the changing process of financial accounting 
practices takes place. 
 
Young points out the advantages of the use of the regulatory space metaphor as that it recognizes 
the complexity of standards setting and agenda formation processes. The metaphor could be used 
as wide theoretical lens to focus upon the issues of agenda information and since the metaphor 
takes the approach of a space it also lead the researcher to the question; who is in this space and 
involved in the process? This lens leads to that the researcher need to widen the examination of 
the organizational boundaries of the standard-setter and take into account the roles of other 
actors.  The lens clarifies that the FASB doesn’t act in a vacuum but in a broader social and 
economic environment and in interaction with other actors and organizations in the regulatory 
space. Focus in the research of Young is also how the interests are seen as constructed and 
interpreted depending on the situation instead of interest being what defines actions of actors 
within the regulatory space. In the regulatory space these actors rather interpret, construct and 
reconstruct their interest while constructing problems, actions and solutions. Using the metaphor 
of regulatory space in the arena of accounting stressed the importance of investigating the actors 
and institutions that contribute to the processes of accounting change.  
 
The conclusions that Young draws from her study is interesting to consider for this thesis study 
of IAASB’s as a standard setter as well. The purpose was to study how the processes through 
which changes in three different accounting issues occur or fail to occur by the lens of the 
regulatory space. First of all, Young suggests that accounting problems are constructed by the 
occupants of the regulatory space and in this process not just the standard-setter, FASB, act alone 
in the construction phase. It was shown in all of the investigated accounting issues that the 
process of constructing accounting problems was related to the existence and interpretations of 
various actors in regulatory space. Issues arise when participants of the space construct them as 
problems, and are solved when FASB creates and “appropriate” solution. By using the regulatory 
space the existence of conflicting perspectives on the description of the accounting problems and 
adequate solutions was visible. It was shown that participation in the process was primarily by 
individuals associated with the largest public accounting firms, large manufacturing or service 
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companies, Congress or other public organizations. Similar to the statements of Hancher and 
Moran (1989), the individual actors, such as academics and the assumed users of financial 
statements, seldom occupy the regulatory space. The study also showed that the process of 
agenda formation includes interpretation by the standard-setter about what the participants in the 
regulatory space expect from them regarding the role and purpose of a standard setter. With her 
study Young shows that an understanding of accounting standard setting also requires an 
understanding of the role of accounting claims and expectations about standard setters that 
construct a regulatory space for accounting change. 
3.5 Jonnergård and Larsson: “Developing Regulatory Space…” 
Jonnergård and Larsson (2007) studied the emergence of a Swedish corporate governance code 
in what can be seen as a new regulatory space. The focus in their investigation is on the debate 
concerning the proposal of a corporate governance code in the processes of referral.  The debate 
was seen as lively and extensive where several issues have been discussed, such as the 
composition of the board and the transparency of the final accounting. By analyzing the 
comment letters to the exposure draft of the new code and comparing it to the final code, 
Jonnergård and Larsson were able to distinguish which groups of actors were most successful in 
their attempt to gain support for their views and opinions.  
 
Jonnergård and Larsson mean that in analyzing and describing regulatory processes the concept 
of regulatory conversation and regulatory space offer new opportunities. The regulatory 
conversations, as conversational activities between organizations, interest groups and other 
actors outline the space. These conversations can be used to understand the definition of issues 
and how acceptable and appropriate solutions are reached. By the development of shared 
meanings, regulation and coordination can be reached and the regulatory space could be seen as 
the scene where the different issues and interest are voiced. One of their conclusions is that to 
understand the division of regulatory space and who is influential in the referral process, it is 
important to look at both the actors that initiate the conversation and the participants in it. They 
also view the regulatory space as a constructed space that changes as participating actors change 
and new regulation issues arise. At last, they conclude that the metaphors of regulatory space as 
well as the regulatory conversation are useful methodical tools that “help to account for 
regulatory changes in the background of internationalization” (Jonnergård & Larsson, 2007, p. 
484). 
  
3.6 Analytical Framework 
Below follows a summary of the main points and characteristics of the regulatory space concept 
that we gathered for the use in our thesis from the research of Hancher and Moran (1989), Young 
(1994) and Jonnergård and Larsson, (2007) as presented in this chapter. This constitutes our 
analytical framework, which we bore with us through the process of writing the thesis, and 
which provided a foundation for analyzing the case of IAASB’s audit report change.  
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The metaphor of regulatory space leads the researcher to the questions of who is inside the space 
and who is involved in the regulatory processes. It also leads the researcher to look beyond the 
organizational borders of the standard setter and examine roles of other actors. Regulatory space 
is available for occupation and therefore will be unevenly divided among major and minor 
actors. Both issues and actors can be included and excluded from the space. Features such as 
historical timing, organizational structures and political and legal settings affect the character of 
a particular regulatory space and how the power is distributed among actors within it. A crisis 
that interrupts the usual routine, often brings consequences of change to regulation or a request 
for different institutional structures, which is why historical timing is said to play an important 
role. In a space, a variety of issues regarding regulation is present, about which the participating 
actors struggle for their benefits. The struggles can be studied in order to understand the power 
distribution and interactions in a regulatory process. Submitting comment letters to a standard 
setter is here seen as one of these struggles and interactions, which has a special focus in this 
thesis. 
  
The most important relationships are said to be the ones between organizations and for regulation 
to be accomplished there is almost always need for cooperation between organizations. To 
understand who is inside and who is outside the regulatory space, it is important to look at 
organizational relationships. Another important matter to explain is the scope of regulatory 
issues. In our case, the issue is the auditing standard concerning the auditor’s report. Issues can 
be seen as constructed as problems by actors within the space, and the standard setter responds in 
a way it deems it appropriate, based on the expectations held by other participants of the space.  
 
Regulatory conversations between different actors can also be seen as a feature that outlines the 
regulatory space. Such conversations can be analyzed to obtain an understanding of how 
appropriate solutions to issues are raised. To be able to draw conclusions about how the 
regulatory space is divided and who the influential actors are in a referral process, like IAASB’s 
outreach, both the participants that initiate the conversation and participate in it are important to 
consider. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter includes a discussion of the concept of regulatory space as developed by Hancher 
and Moran and subsequently used by others in research relevant to this thesis. Through the 
analytical framework, key aspects of the regulatory space is summarized and it can be concluded 
that the concept of regulatory space focuses on the involvement of actors in regulatory processes 
and the relationships between the participating organizations. The concept is considered useful 
for studying changes to regulation in an already existing regulatory space. In the analysis in 
chapter 7, we return to the regulatory space concept for analyzing the empirical material.  
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4. The Development of the Audit Report 
As the concept of regulatory space suggests, identifying how regulatory arrangements have come 
to be in the past is important for understanding regulation today (Hancher & Moran, 1989) This 
chapter discusses briefly the history of the audit report and how it developed from being a free-
from short certification, to the standardized format of today. It also discusses how the current 
audit report standard, ISA 700, was developed and the current requirements of it. Lastly, the 
chapter includes a discussion on how the audit report change came to the agenda of IAASB. 
4.1 The Development of the Standard Audit Report  
As this section will illustrate, the format and content of the audit report has changed substantially 
over the last century, from being an individual description of the audit conducted for each 
engagement to now being a more standardized format containing uniform language (Weirich and 
Reinstein, 2014). A brief historical background to the audit report will be provided, mainly 
concerning the development in the US, as this was considered to be the main center of audit 
development between 1920 and the 1990s (Porter, Simon & Hatherly, 2008). 
 
The name “auditor” comes from that the audit report first was provided as a detailed verbal 
report, before it later came to be in writing. The audit report was in the early 1900’s a 
nonstandardized report often called a certificate, where the auditor certified that accounts were 
for instance truthful or correct. It was not unusual that the report only consisted of just one or 
two sentences, or even of only the word “certified” (Jamal and Sunder, 2013, p. 38; Church, 
Davis and McCracken, 2008). This audit report came to the US from British influence, since the 
accounting profession was introduced in US by British professionals (Carmichael and Winters, 
1986). Below is an example of a typical audit report from this time, given by Price Waterhouse 
& Co (cited in Carmichael & Winters, 1986, p.56): 
 
”We have examined the above accounts with the books and vouchers of the company, and find 
the same to be correct. We approve and certify that the above balance sheet correctly sets forth 
the position of the company.” 
 
There were also long-form audit reports which included information about for example audit 
procedures, how the auditor made judgments on valuations and the how they judged accounting 
methods to be appropriate. There were no official standards of accounting or auditing at this time 
in the US and therefore not much control over the quality of auditing and accounting. The 
economic turbulence in 1907 which harmed the reputation of large corporations is said to have 
created a favorable environment for regulation. The first recommended form of an audit report 
was then issued and after the US stock exchange crash in 1929 the audit report was standardized. 
The auditors also stopped using words such as certify, in order to to avoid stating that they give 
absolute assurance (Carmichael and Winters, 1986; Church, Davis and McCracken, 2008 ).   
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In 1948, the audit report as a pass/fail model similar to today’s first came to be (Weirich & 
Reinstein, 2014). This means that the financial statements of an entity are either considered to be 
fairly presented or not and hence be seen as to pass or fail (ACAP, 2008). From 1948 to 1988 the 
standard audit report was changed several times, however the changes can be considered minor 
and mostly related to wording (Strawser, 1990; Church, Davis and McCracken, 2008).  
 
There were further recommendations and pressures for changing the audit report, for instance 
due to unclear division of responsibilities between the auditor and the management. In 1988 ASB 
therefore established a new standard audit report with the aim of reducing the expectation gap. 
This audit report contained three paragraphs instead of two (Sumutka, 1989). This type of long 
form audit report introduced by AICPA was soon adopted also by IFAC and became standard by 
the beginning of the 1990s (Porter, Ó hÓgartaigh& Baskerville, 2009; Strawser, 1990). 
 
4.2 The Development and Current Requirements of ISA 700 
Taking the lead in global efforts of harmonizing audit reports, the IAPC (predecessor of IAASB) 
issued its first recommendation for the audit report in 1983. This International Audit Guideline 
(IAG) no. 13 was called “The Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements” and was made with the 
aim of guiding auditors to the form and content of the audit report. This was believed to improve 
users’ understanding of the report (Gangolly et al, 2002). To clarify the standard and to change 
the form of the audit report, it was revised in 1989 and again in 1993. The need for a new audit 
report was said to mainly come from the globalization of financial markets where the auditors 
more and more audited financial statements that were used for international financing (Roussey, 
1996). The auditing standards of IAPC were very similar to the ones of AICPA in the US. An 
explanation for this could be the dominance of the large audit firms in both IAPC/IFAC and the 
standard setting board of AICPA (Wallage, 1993). After the revisions, two important elements 
the IAPC’s standard required the audit report to include was: A clear auditor’s opinion on the 
financial position and results of the entities’ operations, as presented in the financial statements, 
and a statement of the responsibility of the management and the responsibility of the auditor 
(Gangolly, 2002; Pucheta & Fakhfakh, 2005). An overview of what the audit report was required 
to include as from 1994 is provided in Appendix 3. At this time the ISAs had been codified and 
the audit report ISA had received its current number, ISA 700 (Roussey, 1996).  
 
After a minor revision in 2001, IAASB again in 2004 made a revision of its standard audit 
report. This time it strived to enhance consistency in auditor reporting between countries and to 
increase the users’ understanding of the audit report and the auditor’s role. To achieve these 
goals, IAASB thought the audit report should mandate which content the report should have 
while keeping it simple, short and succinct (IAASB meeting July 2003). During a Clarity Project 
of all ISAs, which was finished in 2008, the standards got new structures with clearer objectives, 
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requirements, definitions and explanatory material. The ISA 700 had now become what it is 
today (IFAC, 2014e). 
 
Requirements regarding the audit report are stated in many ISAs but it is ISA 700 “Forming an 
Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements” that contains the overall rules for the content 
and form of the audit report. The main elements of the audit report are summarized in Table 1 
below. This can be a useful background to the rest of the thesis, which discusses requests for 
additional information and changes of these requirements. An illustrative audit report as it looks 
today is for the same reason provided in Appendix 4.  
 
Particularly interesting given the focus of this thesis is the Emphasis of Matter paragraph that can 
be included when the auditor wants to draw the reader’s attention to matters in the financial 
statements that it considers “fundamental to the users’ understanding” of them. An Other Matters 
paragraph can similarly be provided when the auditor wished to draw attention to matters that are 
not disclosed in financial statements, but are considered relevant for users. More precisely, it is 
stated in ISA 706 “Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and Other Matter Paragraphs in the 
Independent Auditor’s Report” that the auditor, when considered necessary, draws attention to:   
 
(a) A matter, although appropriately presented or disclosed in the financial statements, that is of 
such importance that it is fundamental to users’ understanding of the financial statements; or 
 
(b) As appropriate, any other matter that is relevant to users’ understanding of the audit, the 
auditor’s responsibilities or the auditor’s report (ISA 706.4). 
 
Elements in the audit report based 
on the current ISA 700 
Summary of what each section includes: 
Title The title should state that it is from an independent auditor. 
Addressee Who the report is addressed to, e.g. shareholders  
Introductory Paragraph E.g. the name of the audited entity, the title of the each 
section of the financial statements that are audited and the 
date or period covered by each statement 
Management’s Responsibility for 
the Financial Statements  
Explains the responsibilities of management or TCWG, i.e. 
those responsible for preparation of financial statements 
Auditor’s Responsibility  Explains the responsibility of auditors and description of what 
an audit includes in term of risk assessment, auditor judgment 
in deciding the audit procedures, evaluation of 
appropriateness and reasonableness of the entities accounting 
policies and estimates. States if the auditor believes it has 
obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to make and 
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Table 1: The Main Elements of Current ISA 700 
4.3 How the change of the audit report came to the agenda  
The current standard on audit reporting, ISA 700, was issued in 2008 as a revised version of the ISA 
700 issued in 2004 (IFAC, 2014f). As the next chapter will partly present, there were at this time 
discussions on audit quality and an increasing request for auditors providing more insight into the 
audit of an entity’s financial statements. IAASB together with the AICPA’s ASB ordered studies to 
address the need of understanding user perceptions of the standard unqualified audit report. The 
purpose behind these four research studies was not to investigate whether a change to the standard 
unqualified audit report was necessary, or to include general and principal topics concerning audit 
communications but rather to obtain information about how various users perceive audit reports 
(IFAC, 2014f, p. 2).  The reports included a finding that suggested that the audit report due to its 
standardized format and language is considered useful only to the extent of finding out if it is 
unqualified or qualified (Coram, Mock, Turner & Gray, 2011). Other findings were that there exists 
an expectation gap between users and auditors in for example the responsibilities of the auditor and 
also that some elements in the report are misunderstood by users, leading to a greater gap (Gold, 
Gronewold and Pott, 2012). 
 
opinion.  
Auditor’s Opinion This is the section where the auditor express its opinion about 
whether the financial statements “give a true and fair view” or 
“present fairly, in all material aspects” in accordance with the 
applicable financial reporting framework. One of these two 
expressions should be used for an unmodified opinion. 
‘Emphasis of Matter’ and ‘Other 
Matter’ paragraphs 
 
If auditor determines that it is necessary to draw attention to a 
matter in the financial statements that is “fundamental to the 
users’ understanding” of the financial statements, this is 
disclosed in an Emphasis of Matter paragraph. Similar in an 
Other Matter paragraph, matters other than those disclosed in 
the financial statements, that are “relevant” for users’ 
understanding, can be discussed.  
Other Reporting Responsibilities Other matters on which regulation, other than ISA, may 
require the auditor to report 
Signature of the Auditor Auditors should sign the audit report 
Date of the Auditor’s Report Not an earlier date than the date the auditor has obtained 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence to base its opinion on. 
Auditor’s Address States the location of the auditor’s practice. 
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At the end of 2010, IAASB thought it had found enough evidence supporting that they should 
explore what changes can be done to audit reporting (IFAC, 2014g). Since for example IOSCO, EC, 
FRC and PCAOB, which will be discussed in the following chapter, had begun investigating ways of 
improving audit reporting and the role of the auditor, IAASB also joined to see how they could 
respond to the requests for change (IFAC, 2014h). The IAASB working group believed that before 
considering possible major changes to ISA 700, they would need more views from a broad range of 
stakeholders. Therefore a Consultation Paper (CP) was issued. IAASB (2011) explains as a 
background that as a response to the situation that the business environment has been facing recently, 
characterized by an increasingly global and complex development and global financing crises, the 
demand and need for the financial reporting has been emphasized. This demand includes the need of 
credible, high-quality financial reporting with more additional information about the entities as well 
as about the process around the quality of the financial reporting. To reduce the level of uncertainty 
connected to investment decisions existing shareholders, potential investors and others seek 
information that they believe is both relevant and reliable.  
 
When developing CP, the working group of IAASB said it took different audit reporting models as 
well as practice in different countries into consideration. For example were UK, Germany and the US 
audit report models for enhancing the usefulness of the audit report reflected upon. The CP was also 
developed on the foundation of that the scope of the audit would remain unchanged (IFAC 2014i). In 
December 2011, the IAASB decided on a project proposal of changing the current ISA 700 and 
related standards, to make audit reporting more relevant and aligned with user needs. In doing so, 
IAASB claims they respond to current user demands for change and particularly strong demands 
from the US, UK and other countries in Europe. Other initiatives, such as from the EC and American 
PCAOB, to improve the audit report were seen as reasons for IAASB to put this on their agenda at 
the same time as well, thereby enabling joint efforts (IFAC, 2014j).  
 
The main user need identified is the one of investors and an aim was to narrow the information gap. 
The information gap is explained as the gap between what information investors think they need to 
make decisions about the entity and the information that is publicly available to them through 
financial statements or otherwise (IAASB, 2011). The IAASB assigned to a Task Force to 
appropriately prioritize the needs of mainly investors and analysts but also consider other interest 
groups such as regulators and creditors. How this prioritization was later made is however not 
explicitly disclosed.  
 
At the same time as considering the responses to the CP, IAASB emphasized the need of looking at 
the audit reporting suggestions of PCAOB and the EC, to show cooperation and to limit the 
alternatives for change (IFAC, 2014g). It was agreed that the IAASB in the case of audit reporting 
would go beyond its usual consultative process, and create additional opportunities for attaining input 
from the public (IFAC, 2014g). In the IAASB’s June 2012 meeting was it decided that a consultation 
document named “Invitation to Comment: Improving the Auditor’s Report” (ITC) would be 
approved and open for comments until October 2012.  
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Figure 2: Overview of Audit Report Due Process  
 
Figure 2 above is an overview over the due process to change the standard. The comment period for 
the Exposure Draft closed in November 2013 and the final draft is intended to be finished in 2014 
and thereafter by the time of 2016 become applicable (IAASB, 2013).  
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter the history of the audit report has been discussed where it has been shown that 
earlier crises or lack of confidence in the audit report has led to changes. The development of the 
ISA 700 and its current requirements has also been presented.  Lastly an overview of how 
IAASB took the audit report change on its agenda was discussed, in where it can be seen that 
pressures from different directions played a great role. The next chapter will introduce and 
outline the structure of IFAC and IAASB and discuss other relevant actors within audit 
regulation.  
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5. The Context 
 
This chapter outlines the context and structure around the IAASB, a standard setting committee 
under IFAC. It is explained how IFAC and IAASB through support from important global 
organizations such as FSB, IOSCO and the World Bank, have positioned themselves as 
important players in the international auditing regulatory space. Further, a number of influential 
organizations and their interests in auditing and audit reporting are outlined. Since it is believed 
that audit regulation is not developed in an isolated context, a presentation of simultaneous 
regulatory activities within the EU and the US is made.  
5.1 The IFAC structure 
This first section outlines the governance structure of IFAC and how the three-tier structure of 
IFAC, its Monitoring Group and its Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) came to be. This 
section further presents IAASB’s composition and due process standard setting in the light of 
various influential bodies.  
5.1.1 IFAC  
IFAC was founded in 1977 as a private organization by 63 national associations of professional 
accountants with the mission to strengthen the worldwide accountancy profession in the public 
interest. To achieve this goal IFAC was aiming to develop high-quality international standards in 
areas such as auditing and assurance, ethics and public sector accounting. Collaboration and 
cooperation projects was established both between the members of IFAC and with other 
international organizations with the goal for IFAC to be an international spokesperson for the 
accountancy profession. Since IFAC was established the amount of members has increased to 
179 and IFAC now presents members from 130 countries and jurisdictions (IFAC, 2014k). 
Today, the members and associates are representing around 2.5 million accountants in various 
fields (IFAC, 2014l). The same year IFAC was founded, the organization also established several 
independent boards and committees to help them in the development of international standards 
and guidance and to focus on different sectors of the profession (IFAC, 2014k). 
 
The vision of IFAC is that the global accountancy profession will be accepted as a respected 
leader in the development of strong and sustainable organizations, financial markets and 
economies. The mission from the foundation day still exists and IFAC works continuously to 
serve and protect the public interest by developing, promoting and enforcing high-quality, 
internationally recognized standards within the area of for example auditing. By its continuous 
work, the organization says it wants to contribute to give the different stakeholders an assurance 
of reliable information in the global economic development (IFAC, 2014l).  To carry out the 
stated mission with the standard setting in the public interest, IFAC established the IAASB to 
function as an independent standard-setting body under IFAC. 
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Loft, Humphrey and Turley (2006) argue that IFAC, through support from powerful 
organizations such as EC, the World Bank, IOSCO and Financial Stability Forum (now Financial 
Stability Board, FSB) has succeeded in positioning itself in an important place in what is called 
the “new international financial architecture”. A significant achievement was when WTO in 
1997 formally acknowledged IFAC as the international standard setter for the profession of 
accountants (World Trade Organisation supports IASC standards, 1997). Around the same time, 
the EC showed interest in the ISAs and implied that ISAs could be subject of implementation in 
the EU countries at a later stage (EC, 1996). 
5.1.2 The Three-tier Structure of IFAC, PIOB and the Monitoring Group 
It was in 2005 after several corporate scandals, such as Enron in 2001, WorldCom in 2002 in the 
US (Foster, 2010) and Parmalat in 2003 (World Finance, 2003) in Europe, that PIOB was created 
as a response to the mistrust in the financial information and in the credibility of audit opinions. 
In this era, quality and integrity of financial information was proven to be important factors for 
confidence in markets and for financial stability. The corporate scandals revealed the need for 
high quality international accounting and audit standards to improve the financial reporting 
around the world. The audit profession was commonly blamed for these scandals and the 
mistrust in the financial information lead to a financial instability (PIOB, n.d.1). This led to new 
contact and communication between the IFAC, the big audit firms and international regulators, 
whose interests started to interlock (Humphrey, Loft & Woods, 2009).  
 
In the beginning of 2003, it was decided that the top priorities for IFAC consisted of setting high-
quality standards and achieving international support and use of ISAs. A meeting with 
representatives of the international regulators IOSCO, the EC, the World Bank, the BCBS and 
the IAIS put pressure on IFAC to improve international auditing and having the IAASB overseen 
by an independent public interest body (Humphrey & Loft. 2009). These mentioned regulators 
founded later the Monitoring Group over IFAC. The Monitoring Group and IFAC decided on a 
plan to reform the standards-setting and compliance activities of IFAC. At this time it was 
criticized that the audit profession itself was setting its own rules and the aim of the reform was 
to improve both the standards governing the audit and the way they were drafted. In addition to 
this, the reform aimed to ensure that the IFAC served the public interest to be able to gain back 
trust regarding the audit profession and the audit reports (PIOB, n.d.1). The new reform thus lead 
to that PIOB was created as an independent body from the profession to oversee the governance 
and activities of the standard-setting bodies of IFAC, which includes IAASB. Questions were 
however raised about which public interest PIOB members would represent and if it could go 
beyond the interest of the global institutions it relied upon (Loft, Humphrey & Turley, 2005). 
 
The global standard-setting in auditing hence consists of a three-tier structure of standard setting 
boards of IFAC, such as IAASB, independent oversight by PIOB and accountability to the 
authorities of the Monitoring Group (PIOB, n.d.2). This structure is shown in the picture below, 
together with for example the IFAC Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG), which consists of e.g. the 
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leadership of IFAC, the head of Forum of Firms and six other nominated by the Global Public 
Policy Committee, all of which will be discussed further in this chapter. The IRLG works with 
the Monitoring Group regarding current audit regulation issues (IFAC, 2014m). The idea behind 
this model between the different organizations is that high quality global standards will be 
produced with help from the profession, but that the standards at the same time will be in 
response to the public interest. The original idea was to have an oversight body entirely 
independent of regulators and the accounting profession, but when PIOB was created its member 
mostly consisted of former regulators that were nominated by international regulatory 
organizations. Humphrey and Loft (2009) argue that regulators now have a crucial position of 
influence within IFAC and that IFAC can be seen as a place where the different interests of 
international regulators and others are pursued. 
  
Figure 3. Main Structure of IAASB and IFAC  
Source: (IFAC, 2014m.; PIOB, n.d.2) 
  
The mission of the Monitoring Group is that it should cooperate in the interest of promoting 
high-quality international auditing and assurance, ethical and education standards for 
accountants. The Monitoring group works for the public interest in areas that are related to 
international audit standard setting and audit quality and consist of different international 
financial institutions and regulatory bodies. The Monitoring Group oversees the IFAC Reforms 
and their implementation processes and effectiveness and also other aspects of the work of IFAC 
that concern the public interest. Furthermore, the mission of the Monitoring Group includes 
appointing the members of PIOB; overseeing the implementation by the PIOB of its mandate; 
and to consult and advice the PIOB (IOSCO, 2014).   
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The PIOB in turn, with its function of a global independent oversight body, works to improve the 
quality of international standards from the standard setting boards within IFAC. Through its 
independent oversight activities, that is provided throughout the entire standard setting process, 
the PIOB tries to improve the quality and the public interest focus in the standard-setting process 
of IAASB. These oversight activities help PIOB to ensure that the development of the standards 
is in response to stakeholder needs and that they are accountable and transparent. According to 
PIOB, it fills a necessary function since it is essential for the financial markets that investors can 
be sure that the available financial information is credible and reliable. PIOB further states that 
by “overseeing the establishment and adherence to high-quality professional standards, the PIOB 
seeks to further the international adoption and implementation of such standards and improve the 
comparability of financial statements across the globe.” (PIOB, n.d.2)  
 
5.1.3 IAASB 
”The IAASB’s objective is to serve the public interest by setting high-quality international 
standards for auditing, quality control, review, other assurance, and related services, and by 
facilitating the convergence of international and national standards. In doing so, the IAASB 
enhances the quality and uniformity of practice throughout the world and strengthens public 
confidence in the global auditing and assurance profession.”(IFAC, 2014n, p. 1) 
 
To be able to work with its mission to issue and develop high-quality auditing and assurance 
standards in the public interest it was decided that IAASB should work as a responsible body 
under its own authority and within its stated terms of reference (IFAC, 2014o). The standard 
setting process is shared with the PIOB and the Consultative Advisory Group (CAG), which 
provides input and guidance. In the work towards its objective IAASB develops and issues 
different standards there the standard that is in focus through this thesis are the International 
Standards on Auditing, ISAs. At the end of 2013 there were over 90 jurisdictions that used or 
were in the process of adopting or incorporating the ISAs, into their national auditing standard or 
used them as a basis for preparing their national auditing standards.  
 
Even though there might be some differences between the adopting and converging process to 
ISAs between the different jurisdictions, IAASB has noticed a strong driving force of global 
adoption and implementation efforts all over the world (IFAC, 2014n). In 2000, the Financial 
Stability Forum recognized ISA’s as one of twelve sets of standards in the world that represented 
sound financial practice and whose implementation would improve and support financial 
stability. The Financial Stability Forum (later FSB) was established as a response by the G7 to 
the financial crisis in Mexico and Asia in the 1990’s after which large audit firms where 
criticized for keeping to deficient national auditing standards. The World Bank plays an 
important part in assessing the compliance with these standards through a program for helping 
countries for instance to implement ISAs in order to improve the system of financial reporting.  
This recognition of the ISAs as best practice and the display of public support meant enhancing 
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their status and making them even more interesting for the EC and also for IOSCO, who now 
encourages the use of ISAs for both cross-border audits and audits of other listed companies 
(Humphrey & Loft, 2009; Loft, Humphrey and Turley, 2006; IOSCO, 2009). In 2006, the EC 
stated that they might agree on making the ISAs mandatory within the EU, however only if the 
ISAs are internationally generally accepted and if they are formed through a due process with 
transparency and public oversight (EC, 2006). 
 
There is a rigorous due process that is followed by IAASB in their work towards developing the 
different standards according to themselves. To be able to serve the public interest they need to 
consider the views from those who are affected by the standards and they collect and obtain 
information from a broad spectrum of stakeholders. This spectrum of stakeholders that IAASB 
identifies consist of: IAASB’s CAG, IFAC member bodies and their members, regulatory and 
oversight bodies, national auditing standards setters, governmental agencies, investors, preparers 
and the general public (IFAC, 2014p). To be able to consider all these different stakeholders the 
due process follows several major steps: research and consultation; transparent debate; exposure 
for public comment; consideration of comments received on exposure; and affirmative approval. 
A project task group is set up with the responsibility to develop a draft standard by doing a 
research and consultation. The proposed standard is then presented as an agenda paper open for 
discussion and debate at an IAASB meeting (IFAC, 2014n). All IAASB meetings are open for 
the public and all meeting material is publicly available on its home page. The task force’s 
meeting material on the other hand is not publicly available. 
 
Through the consultation process IAASB has help from the IAASB Consultative Advisory 
Group which is an integral and important part within this process. The objective of CAG is to 
provide input and assist the IAASB during the consultation with the CAG member organizations 
and their representatives (IFAC, 2014s). The CAG represent different stakeholders that are 
interested in the development and maintenance of the objective of IAASB and consist of 
representatives of regulators, business and international organizations, and users and preparers of 
financial statements (IFAC, 2014n). Examples of CAG members are the EC, FEE, IASB, IOSCO 
and BCBS. CAG fills the function, through active consultation with IAASB, to give important 
public interest input to IAASB regarding its agenda and project timetable, priorities, technical 
projects and other relevant advice to the activities of IAASB (IFAC, 2014s). A full list of 
members in CAG is shown in Appendix 5. CAG representatives hold a non-voting observer role 
at the IAASB’s meetings and provide comments and input on the issues discussed regarding the 
change of the audit report (IFAC, 2014t). The members of CAG therefore have important 
opportunities to influence the course taken by IAASB on various issues during the change of the 
audit report.  
 
The organizational structure of IAASB consists of a full-time chairman and 17 volunteer 
members from around the world.  According to themselves is it a balanced board between 
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practitioners in public practice, with significant experience of auditing and other assurance 
service, and individuals without this practice. Ten members are nominated by IFAC member 
bodies and five members are nominated by the Transnational Auditors Committee (TAC), a 
committee of IFAC that represents the Forum of Firms, i.e. a number of audit firms (Humphrey 
& Loft, 2009). There is also a requirement that the public should nominate at least three 
members of the board. With recommendations from the IFAC Nominating Committee the IFAC 
Board appoints the members. These appointed members also need to be approved by the PIOB 
(IAASB Fact Sheet, 2013). Besides these members in the board of IAASB there is a small group 
of observers in the organization, including a representative of CAG, the EC and the Japanese 
Financial Services Agency (IFAC, 2014p). These observers have a speaking right at the meetings 
but are not allowed to vote (IFAC, 2014n). 
5.2 Key Players in International Audit Regulation   
Having outlined the main governance structure surrounding IAASB and IFAC, we move on to 
further exploring the involvement of international organizations and regulators in auditing and 
audit reporting, such as the EC, IOSCO, IFIAR, and the FSB. These are actors that for example 
Humphrey and Loft (2012, p. 334) identify as “key players in the audit regulatory arena”. This 
arena is explained as having “a myriad of bodies involved in regulatory activities”, and the 
setting of ISAs is an example of such an activity. Together with the World Bank, BCBS and 
IAIS, which also will be introduced in this chapter, these organizations are part of IFAC’s 
Monitoring Group. Humphrey and Loft also took notice of that current audit regulation, 
connected also to national practice, seems to be “driven by events and strategic action at the 
global level” (2012, p. 333) and that IFAC, international regulators, such as the EC and IOSCO, 
and the large multinational audit firms have very interlocking relationships with each other 
(Humphrey, Loft & Woods, 2009). This section will also show that at the same time as IAASB is 
undertaking a project to change the standard audit report, the EC, the UK and the US PCAOB 
have similar agendas.   
 
Before further presentation of the identified key players in international audit regulation an 
overview of most of these bodies is presented in Table 2 below. The table intends to give an 
overview of the organizations’ objective or mission as well as the organizations connection or 
interest of ISAs and the audit report change. Some of the organizations are in the following 
sections discussed separately while others are discussed briefly in connection to some of the 
other key players.  
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Table 2: Key Players in The International Audit Regulation 
Source: IAASB, 2011; IAASB, 2012; IAASB, 2013; IOSCO Technical, 2009; IOSCO, 2009; IFIAR, 
2014; FSB, n.d.1; FSB, n.d.2; World Bank, 2014a; World Bank 2014b; BIS, 2013; FSB, 2012; EC, 
2014a, EU, n.d.1; EU, n.d.2 
Abbreviations Name Established Members Objective / mission
Connection to ISA/ the chnage of 
the audit report
IOSCO
International 
Organization of 
Securities Commissions
1983
Association of national 
securities regulators. 120 
such members and 80 
other organizations 
connected to securities 
markets.
To maintain fair and efficient 
markets  “through the 
promotion of high quality 
accounting, auditing and 
professional standards”.
IOSCO formally endorsed ISAs and 
encourages them for e.g. audits of 
cross-border listings. Interested in 
auditing due to their primary 
objective to protect investors and 
make sure they have appropriate 
information in order to make well-
informed investment decisions. 
IFIAR
International Forum of 
Independent Audit 
Regulators
2006
Association of national 
audit regulators from 50 
countries.
To improve audit quality.
The committee of IFIAR has 
regulatory meetings with the six 
largest audit firms where they 
discuss issues of the audit report. 
In the due process by IAASB  to 
change the audit report, regular 
meetings with IFIAR has occured. 
Only submitted comment letter to 
ED.
World Bank World Bank 1944 Association of 188 nations
To end extreme poverty within 
a generation and boost shared 
prosperity.
Assesses developing countries' 
audit rules and implementation 
compared to ISAs in order to help 
them develop their financial  
reporting infrastructure. Submitted 
comment letters to ITC and ED. 
FSB
Financial Stability 
Board 
2009 (1999)
Authorities from 
jurisdictions that are 
responsible for 
maintaining financial 
stability, such 
asregulatory, supervisory 
and central bank bodies, 
and also international 
financial institutions, 
international standard 
setters 
FSB works at an international 
level to coordinate the work of 
national financial authorities 
and IAASB, among other 
international standard setting 
bodies.  By doing this they 
aim to develop and promote 
the implementation of valuable  
policies of supervisory, 
regulatory and financial 
sector.
FSB considers ISAs as crucial for 
financial reporting and 
continuously review the work of 
IAASB. FSB did not submit any 
comment letters but has had 
meetings with IAASB about the 
audit report.
BCBS
Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision
1974
Central banks and 
organizations which have 
a direct banking 
supervisory authority 
Improve the understanding of 
the main supervisory issues 
and work for improving the 
quality of the banking 
supervision over the world. 
Submitted comment letters to CP, 
ITC, ED.
IAIS
International 
Association of 
Insurance Supervisors
1994
Associaton of insurance 
regulators and supervisors 
from around 190 
jurisdictions that 
representent around 140 
countries.
To promote effective and 
internationally consistent 
regulation and supervision of 
the insurance industry.
Submitted comment letters to CP, 
ITC, ED. 
EC European Comission 1957
28 member states in the 
EU.
Represents the interests of EU 
where it proposes new 
legislation to the European 
Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union.
The EC has since many years 
considered using the ISAs as 
mandatory standards within the 
EU. Did not submit any comment 
letters. 
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5.2.1 The European Union  
One of the main actors in the context of audit regulation is the European Union (EU) through the 
European Commission (EC). Through its mandate, the EC can and has imposed rules on auditing 
on accounting on all of its 28 member states. In the European Union the current rules on auditing 
are stated by the Statutory Audit Directive (EC, 2006, EC, 2014b). In the aftermath of the recent 
financial crisis, while questioning how e.g. banks had been given unqualified audit opinions 
though suffering big losses, the EC issued a Green Paper wanting to stimulate a debate on the 
role and scope of the audit. The EC also stated that it wanted to take a leading role for 
international discussions on this subject (EC, 2010).  
 
In April 2014, the European Parliament accepted a preliminary agreement on a revision of the 
Statutory Audit Directive and a new statutory audit regulation with specific requirements for 
audits of public interest entities (PIEs). These have been expressed as “some of the world's 
toughest new rules for accountants” and one main element of the new rules concerns the audit 
report (Lynch, 2014). The aim is to enhance the audit report’s informative value for investors 
through expanding the audit report for audits of PIEs. PIEs are listed companies, insurance 
undertakings or credit institutions, as well as other entities that a member state put into this 
category because for example the size of the company or the public relevance. The audit report 
must for such entities include a section of key areas of risk of material misstatement and an 
explanation of to which extent the auditor was able to detect fraud or other irregularities (EC, 
2014b). The EC was one of the two members (the other being FSB) of the Monitoring Group not 
submitting comment letters as response to IAASB’s consultation processes regarding the change 
of the audit report.  
 
Parallel to the audit report discussions at the EU level, the United Kingdom (UK) and its 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has been active in discussing it as well, which after 
consultations has resulted in a revised audit standard on audit reporting for companies applying 
the UK Corporate Governance Code. Some of the new requirements include the auditor 
explaining how it applied the assessed risks and the concept of materiality in the planning of the 
audit and providing a description of the risk of identified material misstatement that affected the 
design of the audit (PwC, 2013).  
 
As mentioned before, the EC has since many years considered using the ISAs as mandatory 
standards within the EU. After all, the compliance with IFRS was made mandatory for listed 
companies’ consolidated statements in 2005, making the adoption of ISAs undoubtedly relevant. 
A stated reason for hesitating has been that auditors have set the standards without a proper 
governance structure serving the public interest (Humphrey & Loft, 2012). Humphrey and Loft 
(2012) though argue that the perception of ISAs seem to have improved since the IFAC reforms, 
the founding of PIOB, the IAASB’s clarity project and EU’s involvement in IFAC and the 
standard-setting processes of IAASB. The involvement includes EC being a member of the IFAC 
Monitoring Group and having representatives as members of PIOB as well. Since 2006, the EC 
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attends IAASB meetings as an observer and the CAG meetings as a member, and the EC indeed 
concluded that the governance of IAASB has transformed in such a way that it would be 
acceptable for the EU to adopt the standards (Directorate General for Internal Market and 
Services, 2009). A public consultation was undertaken in 2009, showing that an “overwhelming 
majority” of respondents supported the adoption of ISAs in the EU (Directorate General for 
Internal Market and Services, 2010, p. 2). An adoption of ISA 700 was not foreseen to bring 
much change to audit reports (as they looked then), however some consistency among member 
states would be achieved. The ISAs are to a large extent already in use by the EU member states 
and applied by the big audit firm networks (EC, 2010). 
 
The importance of EU to IAASB can be seen in different meeting minutes of IAASB. At a 
December 2011 meeting where IAASB discussed the responses from its consultation paper they 
also took into account and considered the EC’s Green Paper from 2010 and its responses as well. 
Another indication about how IAASB consider the EC important is from its meeting in March 
2012 where an analysis of EC’s new proposed rules to audit reports was made and compared to 
the corresponding ISA requirements. (IFAC, 2014u; IFAC, 2014v). 
5.2.2 International Organization of Securities Commissions 
Among the members of IOSCO is the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which will be further discussed in section 5.2.3 below, said to be the most powerful regulator and 
has also had a vital function within IOSCO (Humphrey & Loft, 2012). IOSCO has been active in 
audit regulation and audit reporting discussions. In 2007, a roundtable with various stakeholders 
on audit quality was held, and subsequently in 2009, a consultation report inviting comments was 
issued raising some of the concerns that came up during the roundtable. The consultation report 
had the objective of determining if and how the standard audit report or other audit 
communications should change in order to meet the information needs of investors, and it 
introduced the information gap (IOSCO Technical Committee, 2009). It also discussed the 
disadvantages and deficiencies with the current report, such as not providing information that 
enables investors to distinguish between companies, due to the standardized and pass or fail 
nature. The opinions and views of the respondents were found to vary significantly, but IOSCO 
identified extensive support for a global cooperation and strategy to change the audit report, as 
well as encouragement to consider the research and work by international organizations on the 
subject (IOSCO Technical Committee, 2010). IOSCO submitted comment letters to all of the 
sought consultations by the IAASB regarding the audit report.  
 
5.2.3 The United States 
To understand the issues regarding the audit report that are being raised and discussed on a 
global level, it is relevant to consider the activities in other usually influential jurisdictions. We 
have previously taken a glance at the European Union and the United Kingdom, and will in this 
section highlight the audit report situation in the US.  
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In the US, the audit standards are set and audits of public companies are overseen by PCAOB, 
which was created from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, following the Enron scandal and the 
breakdown of audit firm Arthur Andersen. Prior to the establishment of PCAOB, the auditing 
profession was self-regulated without this kind of external oversight. Similar regulatory 
institutions were created around the world to monitor and control audits, in response to the 
jeopardized legitimacy of accounting following the large bankruptcies in this time (Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011). PCAOB is however considered to have wider power and field of responsibility 
than other corresponding national oversight bodies, since it for example sets standards and have 
the authority to inspect also work of foreign auditors of companies listed in the US. (Humphrey 
& Loft, 2012; PCAOB, 2014a) The PCAOB in turn is under oversight from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), who both appoints the members of the board and approves the 
standards (PCAOB, 2014b). SEC has promoted the importance of international consistency 
within auditing, but has not yet endorsed the ISAs. Humphrey and Loft (2012) predict that with 
the increasing acceptance of ISAs around the world, SEC and PCAOB can also be expected to 
follow that path.  
 
In 2010, a project concerning audit reporting was added to the agenda of PCAOB after a report 
by the US Department of the Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP), 
recommended PCAOB to consider enhancing the audit reporting model through a standard-
setting initiative (ACAP, 2008; IFAC, 2014u). After holding outreach activities in 2010 and 
2011 that sought views from different stakeholders, PCAOB issued a concept release asking for 
public comments on how the audit report could be improved (PCAOB, 2011). This was done 
only a few weeks after the IAASB issued its consultation paper on the same topic. The earlier 
outreach had shown that investors value the audit but mean that the auditor should provide more 
useful information based on its important insight to the company. In August 2013, a few months 
after IAASB issued an Exposure Draft (IAASB, 2013), PCAOB released a corresponding 
document with proposed new rules (PCAOB, 2014). The new proposal included for example 
requirements for the auditor to report on critical audit matters. The critical audit matters are 
addressed as the most important change and explained as matters that during the audit consisted 
of difficult auditor judgments (PCAOB, 2014). Providing such information is anticipated to 
reduce the information asymmetry between the corporate management and investors and thereby 
lead to more efficient capital allocation and less cost of capital. The PCAOB and the IAASB 
have had ongoing dialogue throughout their processes of changing the audit report standards and 
have also attended each other’s meetings. 
 
5.2.4 International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
PCAOB alongside other national audit regulators from 50 countries is a member of the 
International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR), a part of IFAC’s Monitoring 
Group (IFIAR, n.d.). Since the start in 2006, IFIAR has grown significantly and increased its 
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discussions and communications with other international organizations in working towards 
improving audit quality. Several of these organizations, such as BCBS, the World Bank, the EC 
and the PIOB, are observers during IFIAR’s meetings, which is an example of how the relations 
of regulatory bodies are interlocked (Humphrey & Loft, 2012). The Global Public Policy 
Committee Working Group of IFIAR regularly meet with representatives from the six largest 
audit firms’ international networks. The purpose is to have a dialogue on issues regarding the 
audit quality and to obtain a better understanding of each other’s work (IFIAR, 2014). Very 
recently, IFIAR published the results from a member survey, which suggested that audits by the 
six largest firms on public companies and financial institutions often are partly deficient and that 
there is a reason for continuing concern regarding audit quality (IFIAR, 2014). IFIAR only 
responded to the IAASB ED regarding the audit report, but regular meetings between IFIAR and 
IAASB has occurred during the process of changing the audit report. Through IFIAR meetings, 
cooperation between regulators is encouraged and information and experiences are shared 
(ACAP, 2008).  
 
5.2.5 Multinational audit firms 
The large multinational audit firms are very active together within issues concerning accounting 
and auditing regulation at the international level. When mentioning these firms, we generally 
refer to the “Big Four” consisting of the networks of EY, KPMG, Deloitte and PwC, and the next 
two largest being BDO and Grant Thornton. The Big Four are said to “possess significant 
resources to organize in the face of adversity” which make them powerful in the global political 
audit arena where the regional or national power has decreased. (Malsch & Gendron, 2011, 
p.473)  
 
In the beginning of 1999, the then largest five audit firms founded the Global Steering 
Committee (GSC), since there was a need for a body to represent the common interest of the 
profession and firms on an international level. This could be seen as a reaction to the criticism 
the auditors received from the World Bank after the Asian Crisis a few years earlier. The aim of 
the GSC was also to contribute to making IFAC a stronger standard setter and body for the 
profession’s self-regulation (Humphrey & Loft, 2009). The GSC was in 2004 made into the 
Global Public Policy Committee (GPPC) with one of the current priorities being the issue of 
confidence in the audit report (ACCA, 2014). Together with regulators such as IOSCO, IASB, 
FSB and BCBS it has also published policy papers on various issues connected to accounting 
and auditing (Humphrey & Loft, 2012).  
 
Audit firms that conduct transnational audits, including the six largest and 21 others, are also 
gathered in the Forum of Firms (Forum), which is working with globally promoting the use of 
high-quality standards and audit practices, including the use of ISAs.  The Forum of Firms has an 
“executive arm” called Transnational Auditors Committee (TAC), which is a committee of IFAC 
and thus formally represents the Forum in IFAC. The Forum and TAC raise issues they believe 
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is in need of change to IAASB or other standard setting boards, provide expertise and as 
mentioned before, nominates members to the IAASB (IFAC, 2014r).  
 
The involvement of the large audit firms in IFAC has increased from the start and in 2005, 12 
out of IAASB’s 18 members were from or had a background in one of the Big Four firms 
(Humphrey & Loft, 2009; Loft, Humphrey  & Turley, 2005). In 2014, there are at least seven 
board members that state such a connection (IFAC, 2014n). Another aspect worth noting is that 
while IFAC used to be financed with only fees from its member bodies, i.e. the national 
professional associations, approximately a third of its budget now comes from the big audit firms 
via TAC and the Forum of Firms (Humphrey & Loft, 2012; IFAC, 2013, p. 96) All of the Big 
Four have submitted comment letters to IAASB’s CP, ITC and ED regarding the audit report. 
Even though the firms are separate national firms within an international network, they have only 
submitted one response each. According to observations by Humphrey and Loft (2012) the firms 
are more and more looking like multinational companies where the global leadership exercises 
control over regional branches.  
 
5.3 Organizational Relationships 
As a way of illustrating the interlocking relationships of the organizations and bodies discussed 
in this chapter, Table 3 below presents a view of membership and observers of the various 
bodies. It especially displays the involvement among IFAC’s Monitoring Group and CAG with 
each other. 
Table 3: Organizational Relationships  
5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has outlined the context and governance structure around the IAASB and IFAC. It 
has explained how IFAC and IAASB through support from international regulators such as FSB, 
IOSCO and the World Bank, have positioned themselves as important players in the international 
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auditing regulatory space. Further, a number of influential groupings of audit firms and 
international regulators and their interests in auditing and audit reporting have been outlined. It is 
shown how heavily interlocked the relationships between those organizations are. It is also worth 
noting that the simultaneous regulatory activities of for instance the EC, the UK and the US seem 
to influence also IAASB’s approach to develop the audit report rules. 
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6. The Development of Key Audit Matters  
 
This chapter presents the findings from the comment letter analysis, which provides an 
understanding of the views held by different stakeholders in the light of IAASB’s proposals. What 
started as a request for input on the necessity of change ended up with an (at the time of writing) 
exposure draft of a proposed new standard audit report and a new ISA, called “Communicating 
Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report” (ISA 701). The first section will provide 
a brief background to the Consultation Paper (CP), while the following sections provides a 
discussion of the development of the new addition to the audit report that in the Exposure Draft 
(ED) is called Key Audit Matters
2
. At last the views of the respondents are presented and 
discussed in comparison to IAASB’s final proposals, first regarding the overall support for the 
concept and then regarding more detailed issues.  
  
6.1 Background to the Consultation Paper 
The CP “Enhancing the Value of Auditor Reporting: Exploring Options for Change” (IAASB, 
2011), was released in May 2011 by IAASB and was open for comments until September the 
same year. The main purpose behind this CP was for IAASB to explore the topic of auditor 
reporting from the views of different stakeholders and from an international perspective.  
Already before the CP was released, consultations, studies and discussions were undertaken 
about the audit report’s value to users of financial statements.  The standard audit report has been 
a subject for change and improvement several times before this CP came up to the agenda, for 
example clarifications enhancement, but these earlier changes were intended to decrease the 
expectations gap and bring more consistency in auditor reporting.  Instead of focusing solely on 
the expectations gap, the consultations, discussions and studies, such as the one made by 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee (2009) showed a new gap, namely the information gap. IAASB 
wanted to consult with different users globally to understand both the different views about the 
content of the audit reports and to understand the different information needs. To their CP, 
feedback was sought from a broad range of stakeholders to the audit report, e.g. users of audited 
financial statements, preparers, auditors and regulators. By this feedback IAASB said it hoped to 
get a better understanding of the opinions on the different areas discussed in the CP to help them 
in the consideration process about how to improve the audit report (IAASB, 2011).  
 
6.2 The Consultation Paper, 2011 
The CP (IAASB, 2011) explored different options for change in auditor reporting to narrow the 
information gap and expectation gap as shown in Figure 4 below.  
 
                                               
2
 The term “Key Audit Matters” is used in the ED (IAASB, 2013) as the name for the new section of the audit report 
containing additional information from the auditor. The term “Audit Commentary” refers to this same section, but 
was used in the CP (IAASB, 2011) and ITC (IAASB, 2012). 
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Figure 4: Options for Change  
Source: (IAASB, 2011, p. 12) 
 
Since this thesis focuses on the auditor commentary, the further presented information will be 
within the area of Part C showed to the left in the model.  This is also one of the options that the 
IAASB chose to proceed with. It is mentioned in the CP that some users of the audited financial 
statements believe that the information that the auditor obtains through the audit process about 
the entity would be of great value for them in their decision-making and some users have also 
suggested an expanded commentary on topics such as e.g.:  
 Key business, operational and audit risks that are considered by the auditor during the 
performance of the financial audit;   
 Different methods and judgments used in the valuations processes; 
 Significant unusual transactions and when changes of accounting policies have a 
considerable impact;  
 Evaluation of the efficiency and quality of risk management and the governance structure 
It is also mentioned in the CP that users that want an expanded audit report believe it will be 
beneficial because it would lead to better transparency of the entity, its audited financial 
statements and the audit itself (IAASB, 2011). An auditor commentary is not a new phenomena 
and the current position for the auditor to draw the users’ attention to certain matters is regulated 
in   ISA 706 “Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and Other Matter Paragraph in the Independent 
Auditor’s Report”, as explained in section 4.2. 
 
According to IAASB some research has shown that the use of the different paragraphs in ISA 
706 often is misunderstood and readers relate it as being something negative and similar to a 
qualification of the audit opinion (IAASB, 2011). In the CP it is mentioned that both an 
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increased use of the Emphasis of Matter paragraph as well as providing additional information 
about the audit by additional paragraphs has been suggested. The discussions relating to 
additional information both involve pros and cons depending on which user’s view is taken into 
account and through the CP the IAASB address the different perspectives. IAASB also asks for 
opinions on whether the auditor should provide insights about the entity and about the quality of 
its financial reporting. Examples of these could be insights and perceptions about the quality and 
effectiveness of the entity’s management, risk management and its governance structure 
(Consultation Paper, 2011). Regarding an auditor commentary, the IAASB (2012), among other 
things, asks respondents for their views and reactions to:  
 
 The auditor presenting additional information about the audit in the audit report 
 The auditor presenting insights about the entity or the quality of its financial reporting in 
the audit report  
6.3 The Invitation to Comment, 2012 
Moving forward in time to the next draft, the “Invitation to Comment: Improving the Auditor’s 
Report” (IAASB, 2012), discussions about an Auditor Commentary continued. Compared to the 
CP that was asking more general questions, the questions asked in the ITC were more detail 
specific with follow up questions depending on if the respondent supported the related issue or 
not. Mentioned in the ITC were suggestions of the points that should at a minimum be 
considered by the auditor when it comes to the decision whether an audit commentary should be 
provided in the audit report or not (IAASB, 2012, p.23f): 
 
 “Areas of significant management judgment (e.g., in relation to the entity’s accounting 
practices, including accounting policies, accounting estimates, and financial statement 
disclosures). 
 Significant or unusual transactions (e.g., significant related party transactions or 
restatements).  
 Matters of audit significance, including areas of significant auditor judgment in 
conducting the audit, for example: 
- Difficult or contentious matters noted during the auditor other audit matters that 
would typically be discussed with an engagement quality control reviewer or TCWG; 
and  
- Other issues of significance related to the audit scope or strategy.” 
In the ITC the IAASB discussed whether the new concept of Auditor Commentary as a more 
holistic concept would lead to that the Emphasis of Matter and Other Matters paragraphs no 
longer would be necessary. One of their proposals was that these matters could be replaced by 
and included in the new Auditor Commentary. Among other areas discussed and directly 
questioned in the ITC compared to the CP was about the stated objective of the Auditor 
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Commentary and to which entities’ audits this Audit Commentary should be provided (ITC, 
2012). 
 
The stated objective for the Audit Commentary as suggested in the ITC was to “provide 
transparency about matters that are, in the auditor’s judgment, likely to be most important to 
users’ understanding of the audited financial statements or the audit” (IAASB, 2012, p. 25). In 
the illustrative audit report provided in the ITC are five examples shown of how the Audit 
Commentary could be used in practice. The examples were provided to show that the matters and 
related content that the auditor should comment on could vary depending on the context and the 
judgment of the auditor. These illustrative examples are new for the ITC. The Auditor 
Commentary has developed from the CP to the ITC as shown in Table 4 below.  
Table 4: The Auditor Commentary Definition 
Source: (IAASB, 2011, p.28; IAASB, 2012, p.10) 
 
6.4 The Exposure Draft, 2012 
In the Exposure Draft “Reporting on Audited Financial Statements: Proposed New and Revised 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs)” (IAASB, 2013) the concept of Auditor Commentary 
as it was suggested in the ITC, is changed. The name of the earlier Auditor Commentary is now 
changed to Key Audit Matters and instead of requiring such disclosure for audits of PIEs, the 
suggestion now changed to listed entities. In addition, a new standard for determining what 
information the auditor should disclose was developed. The proposed use of ISA 701 
“Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report” will according to 
IAASB lead to a major change in practice (IAASB, 2013). 
 
Presented in Table 5 below is how the information about Audit Commentary or later Key Audit 
Matters would be presented in an audit report. The left column shows the proposal from the ITC 
and the right column the proposal from the ED. In both the ITC and ED, IAASB provided 
examples of what key audit matters could be. One example used in both ITC and ED is goodwill, 
Consultation Paper Invitation to Comment
”Matters significant to users’ understanding of the 
audited financial statements, or of the audit”.
“Without modifying our opinion, we highlight the 
following matters that are, in our judgment, likely to be 
most important to users’ understanding of the audited 
of the financial statements or our audit.”
“Our audit procedures relating to these matters were 
designed in the context of our audit of the financial 
statements as a whole, and not to express and opinion 
on individual accounts or disclosures.”
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which regarded the level of uncertainty and judgment involved in the impairment test. The 
information in the ED was changed to being more focused on the audit procedures related to 
each matter, but a paragraph containing only information about audit strategy was removed. The 
examples from ED are provided in an illustrative audit report in Appendix 6. The IAASB’s aim 
is that the information provided in this section of the audit report would be shaped after the 
circumstances of the specific audit and company. The additional information should also be 
consistent with what is disclosed in the financial statements.  
 
 
 
Table 5: The Key Audit Matters Definition   
Source: (IAASB, 2012, p.10; IAASB, 2013, p.13) 
 
The main changes from ITC to ED are: 
 That the auditors should provide matters that in their professional judgment are of most 
significance in their audit of the consolidated financial statements, and not what kind of 
information that would be most likely important to the users’ understanding of audited 
of the financial statements  
 That the provided additional information in the ED should be selected from matters that 
have been discussed with those charged with governance (TCWG);  
 That the proposed ISA is required for listed companies in the ED instead of PIEs in the 
CP.  
The first main change mentioned above is related to how to decide which matters that should be 
included. It was proposed in the ED to have a principles-based approach that will leave it to the 
auditor’s judgment to decide at what level of detail that individual matter should be included in 
the auditor’s report. Further, the IAASB mentions that for the communication of key audit 
matters to have value to users it will also be necessary for the auditor to explain why some 
Invitation to Comment Exposure Draft
Audit Commentary Key Audit Matters
“Without modifying our opinion, we highlight the 
following matters that are, in our judgment, likely 
to be most important to users’ understanding of 
the audited of the financial statements or our 
audit. 
“Key audit matters are those matters that, in our 
professional judgment, were of most significance in our 
audit of the consolidated financial statements. Key 
audit matters are selected from the matters 
communicated with [those charged with governance], 
but are not intended to represent all matters that were 
discussed with them” 
Our audit procedures relating to these matters 
were designed in the context of our audit of the 
financial statements as a whole, and not to 
express and opinion on individual accounts or 
disclosures.”
“Our audit procedures relating to these matters were 
designed in the context of our audit of the consolidated 
financial statements as a whole. Our opinion on the 
consolidated financial statements is not modified with 
respect to any of the key audit matters described 
below, and we do not express an opinion on these 
individual matters.” 
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matters are of significance in the audit. It is thus needed for auditors to provide insight about why 
a matter is seen as a key audit matter. The proposed ISA 701 however allows for flexibility for 
the auditor to determine this. It is also among the suggestions that the judgment of the auditor 
should determine if it is necessary to include an explanation to why a matter is seen as a Key 
Audit Matter. To assist the auditor, paragraphs in ISA 701 include guidance to support the 
professional judgment regarding how this should be communicated (IAASB, 2013, p. 21).  
 
Mentioned already in connection with the CP was ISA 706 “Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and 
Other Matter Paragraphs” and discussions regarding this standard continued in the ITC. In the 
ITC focus was on whether these paragraphs should be kept separately or be replaced by the 
Auditor Commentary, later Key Audit Matters. In the proposals of the ED it is suggested that 
ISA 706 should remain and that it would be no change to the current concepts of Emphasis of 
matter Paragraphs and Other Matters paragraphs. Instead IAASB mention that the relationship 
between the proposed ISA 701 and the current ISA 706 need to be clarified to make it clear that 
matters determined to be a Key Audit Matter is not referred to the paragraphs of ISA 706. 
 
6.5 Comment letters 
After having reviewed IAASB’s process of developing an Auditor Commentary section and its 
different proposals, the views and roles of the respondents will be discussed. A first basic 
conclusion we were looking to make when analyzing comment letters was if the respondent was 
generally positive or negative to the concept of Auditor Commentary as introduced by IAASB. 
In Table 6 below the overall opinions regarding the suggested new element of Auditor 
Commentary is illustrated. The conclusions about the different respondents’ views about this 
new element in the audit report are based on their responses in their comment letters to the CP 
and the ITC, or just one of them in the case of just one submitted letter. Table 6 intends to give 
an overview about the general opinions to be able to distinguish the actors that are clearly not 
positive to this new proposal from the ones that are more supportive. The table does not intend to 
give a description regarding the arguments behind the position to the proposed change and 
instead this will be further described in subsequent sections. All examined comment letters are 
taken from IFAC’s website (IFAC, 2014b; 2014c) 
 
The fourth column in Table 6 shows for which entities the different respondents think Auditor 
Commentary should be required, if stated so in the comment letters. In some of the respondents 
comment letters was it not possible to code out what they thought about the issue and in these 
cases they are described with not applicable (n.a.) instead. Since most of the respondents had 
concerns they are coded in the table as “Supports the concept, raises concerns” when they are 
positive to the concept of Auditor Commentary but have several concerns. Other respondents 
that were more positive to the concept are coded as “Supports the concept”. Some of the 
respondents explicitly stated in their responses that they strongly disagree with the the concept 
and are coded thereafter while the others that didn’t explicitly mention it with such words are 
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mentioned as “Doesn’t support the concept”. As seen in the table some respondents were 
supportive to IAASB’s work with exploring the concept but also mentioned that they were 
satisfied with the current audit report.  
 
Given that the table intends to provide an overview, not all stakeholders groups will be 
separately discussed regarding their overall support for the commentary, but rather mentioned in 
the discussion of different issues. However, four stakeholder groups will be discussed also 
separately, namely preparers, investors and analysts, the Big Four audit firms and the regulators 
and oversight bodies, for the reasons stated in section 2.4.4 of the method chapter.  An overview 
is provided in Appendix 2 over the organizations’ full names and to which of IAASB’s calls for 
comment they responded. 
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Table 6: The Overall Opinion Regarding Auditor Commentary    
Source: (IFAC, 2014b; 2014c) 
Respondent group 1. Overall opinion of Auditor Commentary 2. Requirement for which entities?
Preparers of Financial 
Statements
Group of 100 A Strongly disagrees with the concept n.a.
CNRL Strongly disagrees with the concept All entities
BusinessEurope Strongly disagrees with the concept Left to jurisdiction to decide
100 Group UK Doesn't support the concept n.a.
Profession KPMG Partial support Listed entities
EY Increasing support, raises concerns Listed entities
PwC Supports the concept, raises concerns Listed entities
Deloitte Supports the concept, raises concerns For certain entities (e.g. PIEs)
Mazars (France) Supports the concept All entities
SAR Supports the concept PIEs
Baker Tilly Strongly disagrees with the concept For PIEs, when consistent definition
Regulators and oversight 
bodies
EAIG Supports the concept, raises concerns n.a.
BCBS Supports the concept, raises concerns PIEs
World Bank Doesn't support the concept n.a.
IOSCO Doesn't support the concept n.a.
IAIS Supports the concept, raises concerns All entities
ESMA* Supports the concept, raises concerns Listed entities and PIEs
TCWG OECD Supports the concept, raises concerns Certain entities
IIA Some support, raises concerns All entities
AICD Doesn't support the concept PIEs (lif listed)
Investors and analysts BlackRock Supports the concept PIEs
HEOS Supports the concept Listed entities
EUMEDION Supports the concept Listed entities
S&P Supports the concept All entities
ICGN Supports the concept PIEs, including listed Companies
Member Bodies and Other 
Professional Organizations
ICAN Supports the concept, raises concerns Listed entities and for significant PIEs
ZICA Some support, satisfied with the current report n.a.
ACCA* Supports the concept All entities
ICAEW* Supportive,but satisfied with the current report Listed entities
ICPAS Supports the concept, raises concerns PIEs
CAQ* Supports the concept, raises concerns n.a.
EFAA Supportive, but satisfied with the current report PIEs
FEE* Supportive but not for SMEs PIEs
IDW * Some support, satisfied with the current AR Listed entities
National Auditing Standard 
Setters & Public Sector
UK FRC* Supports the concept, raises concerns Certain entities
ASB Supports the concept Listed entities
CAASB Doesn't support the concept Left to jurisdiction to decide
JICPA Undecided Listed entities
NAOS Supports the concept Provide AC for public sector entities
CNAO Supports the concept n.a.
AGNZ Doesn't support the concept Most likely for PIEs
57 
 
6.5.1 Overall support for Auditor Commentary 
In the CP the concept of Auditor Commentary was not specifically defined, which lead to many 
respondents having concerns about the approach. Concerns raised by almost every respondent 
involved blurring the division of responsibilities, being that the responsibility of management or 
those charged with governance (TCWG) is to provide information while the responsibility of 
auditors is to provide assurance on such information. As explained in section 6.3, the concept of 
Auditor Commentary was further developed in the ITC. A concept in the audit report where the 
auditor is expected to give some information about the entity and the audit on the financial 
statements or repeat information already contained in the financial statements would according to 
many make the expectation gap even wider.   
 
6.5.2. For which entities Auditor Commentary should be required  
One issue that the IAASB has sought feedback on is whether the Auditor Commentary, 
subsequently Key Audit Matters, should be required for all or just certain entities. The final 
suggestion in ED was that it would be required for listed companies. The specific question 
regarding this was asked in the ITC.  The suggestion then by IAASB was that it would be 
required for Public Interest Entities (PIEs). As shown in Table 6 there were a variety of 
responses to this issue. In some responses it was not possible to code out for which entities the 
respondent thinks it should be required and some of the respondents that didn’t like the concept 
of Auditor Commentary have not answered the question. The most common views were that the 
requirement would be for either all entities, listed entities, PIEs or left to each jurisdiction to 
decide. 
 
Among the investors only Standard & Poor’s thought it should be required for all entities with 
the argument that they seek the same level of information from all entities regardless of size and 
nature. Even though CNRL didn’t support the concept they also thought that there should be one 
standard audit report applicable to all entities. BlackRock specifically mentioned that they 
wanted investment companies to be excluded from the requirement. The preparers, who did not 
support the concept, did not answer for which entities they thought Auditor Commentary should 
be mandated. There were different opinions among the audit firms. Three of the big four audit 
firms, KPMG, EY and PwC, expressed concerns regarding international differences in the 
definition of PIEs, and therefore recommended mandating Auditor Commentary to audits of only 
listed entities, while proposing IAASB to further consider the definition of PIEs. Baker Tilly was 
also of the view that the definition needed to be clearer and mentioned that if a consistent 
definition of PIEs was developed it could be accepted for PIEs but not for non-PIEs. Mazars was 
the only audit firm in the sample that thought it should be required for all entities.  
 
Looking at Deloitte’s comment letter to the CP compared to the one to the ITC they appeared to 
have changed their mind. In the earlier response they stated that all changes made to the audit 
report should apply to all kinds of entities, by stressing the importance of uniformity. Otherwise 
58 
 
they said the inconsistency will make the information gap and expectation gaps even wider. In 
the ITC response however, Deloitte agrees with IAASB that the Audit Commentary only should 
be required for audits of PIEs only. PwC on the other hand, promoted already in their CP 
response that they supported additional information requirements for audits of listed companies 
and PIEs, which is similar to how IAASB’s approach in the ED.  
  
In the comment letters from regulators and oversight bodies, such as IOSCO, EAIG and the 
World Bank it was not clear for which entities they thought Auditor Commentary should be 
required. Among the other respondents in this group the opinions were that is should be required 
for either PIEs, listed or all entities.  BCBS also mentioned in connection to their opinion of PIEs 
that they think that the definition of PIEs should include banking organizations. IAIS explained 
that they thought Auditor Commentary should be required for all entities because otherwise there 
is a risk that the audit reports without an Auditor Commentary could be perceived as having 
lower quality.  
 
The responses from TCWG, member bodies and other professional organizations and national 
auditing standard setters and public sector showed a variety of opinions. Both concerns about the 
definition of PIEs and the big burden it would be for SMEs were mentioned. According to EFAA 
it should only be required for PIEs since the existing paragraphs of Emphasis of Matter and 
Other Matters are enough to satisfy the user’s information needs of the financial statements of 
SMEs.   
 
The IAASB motivated its decision to only mandate Key Audit Matters for listed entities by 
saying that it listened to responses that had concerns about a proper definition of PIEs. Further, it 
said that a possible requirement for other entities can be evaluated after the new rules have been 
implemented. IAASB also noted that national auditing standards or law could require the new 
rules for other than listed entities. The reason that it is not required for all entities is that the 
requests for this type of commentary comes from institutional investors and analysts, and that 
users of other companies than listed and PIEs probably have access to this kind of information 
anyway through for example direct contact with management (IAASB, 2013). 
 
6.5.3. Preparers of Financial Statements 
Preparers were one particular group that strongly disagreed with IAASB’s approach. Examples 
of arguments used were: 
 
 Blurs distinction of role and responsibility of auditor and management or TCWG. 
 Could become costly to implement by auditors 
 Could create tension between auditors and TCWG / management 
 The content of the commentary could be interpreted as a hidden qualification of the audit 
opinion 
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The preparers promoted other approaches for IAASB to take instead. Two of these were: 
 100 Group UK recommended keeping a short-form audit report with Emphasis of Matter 
and Other Matters paragraphs, while explaining the auditor’s approach more, including 
e.g. applied materiality levels and locations the auditor visited. Views on key issues and 
judgments should instead be reported by the company’s audit committee. 
 BusinessEurope suggested removing the Auditor Commentary concept altogether and 
instead focusing on making the section on auditor responsibilities more narrative and 
clear, which would include disclosures of areas that were identified as significant audit 
risks according to requirements in other ISAs. 
 
It is not found that the suggestions of these two preparers were incorporated into IAASB’s 
proposals in either ITC or ED. The proposed audit report is now four pages long, instead of the 
current one page audit report.  In the illustrative audit report provided in the ED (see Appendix 
6) Key Audit Matters takes up one and a half pages. The suggested disclosure of audit 
procedures and significant audit risks could however possibly be included by the auditor within 
the description of Key Audit Matters although they are not among the requirements or guidelines 
by IAASB.  
 
6.5.4 Investors and Analysts 
While having many of the same concerns as preparers, the group of investors was generally 
supportive of the concept of Auditor Commentary. The concerns were rather mentioned as 
aspects and principles to consider while further developing the criteria to the new section of 
additional information. The investors list information which they believe the Auditor 
Commentary should contain in order to be useful, much of which can be seen as later related to 
IAASB’s concept of Key Audit Matters. Such information is for example identification of 
significant or unusual transactions, areas with significant management judgment and matters of 
audit significance or audit judgment. The investors, alone or in agreement, however also 
considered other information to be very relevant and requested information that by IAASB was 
not directly included in Key Audit Matters: 
 Identification of significant new accounting principles and evaluation whether they are 
preferable 
 Auditor assertion on whether the financial accounts are prepared on a neutral basis 
 Information contained in the audit completion memo, such as unadjusted audit 
differences, difficult issues or "close calls" and their resolution 
 Internal control weaknesses 
 
6.5.5 The Big Four Audit Firms 
The Big Four, i.e. KPMG, PwC, Deloitte and EY, are part of what in chapter 5 in this thesis calls 
the context around IAASB. Many of IAASB’s board members have, as mentioned before, a 
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background from one of these firms. In their responses to the CP, all four were rather concerned 
about providing additional information in the audit report. In the responses to the ITC however, 
the answers was a bit more optimistic and they all acknowledged that an Audit Commentary 
would be valuable, especially when drawing attention to specific disclosures in the financial 
statements. However, as explained in the coming paragraph, not all their proposals or concerns 
were incorporated into the proposed concept of Key Audit Matters.  
 
KPMG were in the response to the CP in favor of changing the corporate governance model 
instead of the audit reporting model (see Figure 4), and regarding the audit report, they, together 
with EY, favored an expanded use of the Emphasis of Matter paragraph. As for IAASB’s 
examples of additional information that could be provided by the auditor, KPMG, EY and 
Deloitte believed the disadvantages, such as efforts and costs for timely creating such a 
commentary, would outweigh the benefits. In the ITC response, KPMG, EY and Deloitte were 
supportive of the auditor providing information that is likely to be important for users’ 
understanding of financial statements, but not the audit. Similarly, PwC stated support for the 
Auditor Commentary to consist of highlighting of matters from the financial statements where 
significant management judgment was made, if useful for users’ understanding. 
 
All firms stressed the importance of finding out what information users would consider most 
useful in their decision making. One of the reasons for excluding information about the audit 
itself was the anticipation that the auditor would not be able to explain complex issues regarding 
the audit procedures in a short and understandable way, causing the user to misunderstand for 
example the level of assurance given. Further, PwC stated in its CP response that reporting on 
information, such as areas of difficulty during the audit and audit procedures regarding matters 
of significant risk, would for example be damaging for audit quality since the risk of hurting the 
auditor’s relationship with management and TCWG. Deloitte recommended IAASB that the 
following matters should be basis for consideration when determining issues to disclose in an 
audit commentary:  
 
 Transactions that are significant or uncommon 
 Matters with significant management judgment 
 
Such matters can be included in the Key Audit Matters as proposed by the IAASB in the ED, but 
it is not the basis for consideration as shown in section 6.4. It is rather the audit, the areas of 
difficulties within the audit and the significant risks that are basis for consideration when 
determining which matters to disclose according to proposed ISA 701. 
6.5.6 Regulators and Oversight Bodies  
The sample of  respondents from regulators and oversight bodies consist of both the important 
organizations surrounding IFAC described in chapter 5, i.e. IAIS, World Bank, IOSCO, BCBS, 
and in addition the European bodies of ESMA and EAIG. The opinions differed among the 
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regulators and oversight bodies regarding the proposed concept of Auditor Commentary. All of 
them raised concerns such as the audit report becoming boilerplate and that the auditor should 
not provide information that is not already in the financial statements. However, there are some 
differences where EAIG, BCBS, IAIS and ESMA are more supportive to the proposed change 
while IOSCO and World Bank is not that supportive.   
 
BCBS was generally positive to the proposals and also recommends in their answer to the CP 
that the IAASB should consider to include in the Auditor Commentary an assurance on the 
internal controls and it effectiveness, which is however not included in the proposal in ED. EAIG 
welcomes the proposed change and believes that it is a very appropriate way to inform the users 
of the financial statements about the audit but also criticizes it for being too descriptive in nature 
and not giving the added value of the auditor’s views based on how the audit was conducted. 
They also recommend that IAASB should consider adding to the Auditor Commentary a 
summary of the auditor’s risk analysis and audit strategy used to reduce significant audit risks 
where the risk of fraud should be included. Even if such a summary is not included in the Key 
Audit Matter in the ED, the reference to risk of material misstatement due to fraud is included.  
 
Both the World Bank and IOSCO have been categorized as not supportive of the concept 
because of concerns and that they questioned the value of the Auditor Commentary. For 
example, World Bank and IOSCO explain that they do not see how the Auditor Commentary and 
its lower threshold differ from Emphasis of Matter and they also point out that it would require 
too much competence from the users to understand the suggested information in Auditor 
Commentary.  
 
6.6 Views on Specific Issues 
Except for respondents overall opinion of IAASB’s proposal of Auditor Commentary, some 
specific issues related to Auditor Commentary/Key Audit Matters has been identified. These are 
selected with the aim of illustrating if the different respondents’ opinions are in line with the 
suggestions in ED or not. As will be evident in the tables, not every respondent has provided a 
specific opinion on every issue. This since some of the issues were not explicitly asked for by 
IAASB and since the extent and focus of the individual responses vary to a great extent.   
6.6.1 Whether or Not to Include Materiality 
Among the respondents, there were many different views regarding what information the auditor 
should provide in the new section of Auditor Commentary. Given the guidelines proposed by the 
IAASB in the ED, it is not always easy to determine which suggestions got incorporated. 
However, one kind of information related to the planning of the audit, namely materiality, was 
by some respondents particularly pointed out as either very useful or very inappropriate to 
disclose.  
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Three investors were of the view that applied materiality also should be disclosed, while one 
specifically wanted to exclude materiality thresholds and audit procedures from the Auditor 
Commentary section. Two regulators and oversight bodies meant that providing information 
about applied materiality would be useful for users’ understanding of the depth of the audit and 
therefore the assurance the auditor can give. KPMG, Mazars and Deloitte however doubted the 
usefulness of and interests in such information. They highlighted the risk of such information 
being confusing, due to the inconsistency between audits, and due to either being too short or too 
long to understand. BlackRock also did not support disclosure of materiality due to the many 
quantitative and qualitative considerations that lie behind the determination of a materiality 
threshold.  IAASB states in the ED that it does not believe that issues regarding the planning and 
scope of the audit, such as materiality, would meet the definition of a Key Audit Matter and 
further states that such a disclosure will not be required. 
 
Table 7: Materiality Included in The Auditor Commentary 
 
6.6.2 Whether the Use of Key Audit Matters Should be Voluntary for Other Audits 
As mentioned earlier, the IAASB in its ITC proposed that a section of Auditor Commentary 
would be mandatory for audits of PIEs. Furthermore, the proposal entailed that it would be up to 
the discretion of the auditor whether to include it for audits of other entities. Table 8 below 
shows some of the views. PwC and especially Baker Tilly presented strong views against it. 
They were of the opinion that the quality of audit reports to non-PIEs in which no Auditor 
Commentary was provided would be perceived as of lower quality. Baker Tilly expressed that if 
leaving the inclusion voluntary, it would lead to big inconsistencies among firms and the IAASB 
would therefore undermine the quality of the audit report to small entities. Standard & Poor’s 
pointed out that they want the same kind of information available for each company, regardless 
of size and if public or private. Therefore they proposed that Auditor Commentary should be 
compulsory for audits of all entities.   
Yes No
Preparers
Group of 100 A, 100 
Group UK
CNRL
Profession Baker Tilly Mazars, Deloitte, KPMG
Regulators and oversight 
bodies
EAIG, ESMA
TCWG
Investors and analysts
HEOS, EUMEDION, 
ICGN
BlackRock
Member Bodies and Other 
Professional Organizations
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
UK FRC
Whether information about applied                                                           
materiality should be included in Auditor Commentary
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Table 8 is based on the respondents that have explicitly mentioned whether they believe it should 
be voluntary or not to use an auditor commentary. In some cases where the respondents strongly 
disagree with the concept of Auditor Commentary, they do not mention for which this should be 
required or if it should be voluntary. In many of the comment letters a third option is favored 
where it is up to national legislation to decide for which entities it should be required, other than 
for the ones IAASB mandates. Some respondents, i.e. BusinessEurope, ICAEW, CAASB, IDW 
and JICPA, thought it should be up the national legislation to decide regarding the entities that 
IAASB does not require Audit Commentary for. 
 
Table 8: Auditor Commentary Voluntary 
6.6.3 How to Select Key Audit Matters 
When determining which issues to include as a Key Audit Matter, the IAASB proposes in its ED 
that the auditor should choose from matters that are communicated with TCWG. ISA 260 
“Communication with Those Charged With Governance” already requires such communication 
with TCWG, who are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process. This two-way 
communication is stated important for establishing a good beneficial relationship that, among 
other things, enables the auditor to understand the entity better and together with TCWG reduce 
the risk of material misstatement in the financial statements. The idea of the auditor providing 
users with insights to this communication has developed through the IAASB’s consultation 
process. In the CP, IAASB mostly provided readers with different possible options on what 
additional information previous feedback had suggested and their advantages and disadvantages. 
In the ITC, IAASB’s proposal was that Audit Commentary would highlight matters that are “in 
the auditor’s judgment, likely to be most important to users’ understanding of the audited 
financial statements or the audit” (ITC, 2012, p. 22). Examples of such information were 
provided, but further guidance for the auditor was not yet developed. As was discussed above, 
this description led to many concerns from respondents, since it includes both matters on the 
Yes No
Preparers
Profession
Deloitte, EY, Mazars, 
SRA
Baker Tilly, PwC
Regulators and 
oversight bodies
TCWG AICD
Investors and analysts HEOS S&P
Member Bodies and 
Other Professional 
Organizations
ICPAS, ACCA, EFAA, 
FEE
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
ICAN, UK FRC
Auditor Commentary voluntary for other audits
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audit and the actual financial statements, and that it is not considered the role of the auditor to 
know what users need in order to understand the financial statements.  
 
In the selection of this study, the respondents displayed to the left in Table 9 below had already 
in their response to the CP stated that insight to the auditor's communication with TCWG would 
be very useful. At the same time, the respondents displayed to the right explicitly stated that this 
kind of communication is problematic and inappropriate for the auditor to disclose. Mazars 
meant that there would be value for shareholders and other users to obtain information on 
important issues that arise during the audit, such as key audit matters that are discussed among 
the auditor and the board or audit committee. CAASB, although not positive to the Auditor 
Commentary as a whole, mentioned that if IAASB proceeds with such a section in the audit 
report, there should be a connection between that and the matters discussed with TCWG. Baker 
Tilly and KPMG (in its response to CP) on the other hand, while acknowledging the 
attractiveness of such information for users, warned for the consequences of disclosing this 
information in the audit report that is meant to be as a two-way communication. There is a risk 
that the less informed reader gets confused by these statements and finds the financial statements 
less credible as a result. In its response to ITC, KPMG however mentioned that the 
communication with TCWG could be considered when determining if a matter was seen as 
important for the users’ understanding of financial statements. Baker Tilly, while still 
withholding its concerns, also suggests that the specific issue of significant risks that auditors 
communicate with TCWG could be linked to the Auditor Commentary. CAQ has another 
argument, being that requiring public disclosure of such information would lead to weaker 
discussions between the auditor and TCWG because of worry that the information discussed will 
need to be disclosed in the audit report. The two investors in Table 9 both requests insight into 
such communication, but believe this rather should be disclosed by TCWG or the Audit 
Committee than by the auditor. 
 
 
Table 9: Matters Communicated with Those Charge With Governance 
Positive Negative
Preparers
Profession KPMG, EY, Mazars Baker Tilly
Regulators and oversight 
bodies
TCWG
Investors and analysts HEOS, EUMEDION
Member Bodies and Other 
Professional Organizations
ACCA, IDW CAQ
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
CAASB
Disclosing information about matters communicated with TCWG
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6.6.4 Key Audit Matters in Relation to Emphasis of Matter and Other Matters 
In the current ISA requirements, the auditor can highlight matters in an Emphasis of Matter 
paragraph that the auditor consider essential for the users’ understanding of the financial 
statements. In an Other Matter paragraph, topics that are relevant for the understanding of the 
audit can be highlighted. In the ITC, IAASB proposed that the new section of Auditor 
Commentary in the audit report, which was considered to be a more “holistic” approach, would 
replace the possible use of these two paragraphs (IAASB, 2012, p. 23). Table 10 below shows 
that some investors, a member body and a regulator agreed with the IAASB, while audit firms, 
regulators like IOSCO and some more member firms disagreed and thought these concepts 
should be kept even though an Auditor Commentary is introduced. The arguments for keeping 
the Emphasis of Matter and Other Matter were for example by UK FRC and ICAEW that the 
power of such paragraphs would be gone when mixed with the other matters and that it is useful 
to have a gradation of the auditor comments. For entities where an Auditor Commentary would 
be required, JICPA thought it appropriate to replace the Emphasis of Matter and Other Matter 
paragraphs, but considered it necessary to keep them for the audits of other entities, where the 
commentary is not required.  
 
In the ED, the IAASB had changed its view and was proposing to keep the Emphasis of Matter 
and Other Matter paragraphs, with the argument that it highlights matters that are not defined as 
a key audit matter, but also because audits of other entities than where a section of Key Audit 
Matters is required may need this device.  
 
Table 10: Emphasis of Matter and Other Matter Paragraphs  
 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has focused on the process of developing the new section of the standard audit 
report called Key Audit Matters. The results from the comment letter analysis from responses to 
Yes No
Preparers
Profession PwC, Mazars, SRA
Regulators and oversight 
bodies
IOSCO, IRBA, 
ESMA
IAIS
TCWG
Investors and analysts EUMEDION, ICGN
Member Bodies and Other 
Professional 
Organizations
ACCA, EFAA, FEE, 
ICAEW
JICPA
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
UK FRC
Emphasis of Matter and Other Matter paragraphs should be 
kept even though Auditor Commentary is introduced
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the IAASB’s outreach documents CP and ITC have been presented. In the light of different 
issues it can be seen that different actors have been more or less active in trying to influence the 
standard setting. The “success” of their argumentation and opinions varies to a great extent 
depending on the issue.   
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7. Analysis 
In this chapter, we return to the concept of the regulatory space. The empirical material 
presented in chapter 4-6 will provide a basis for analyzing the audit report standard setting as a 
regulatory space, in which different actors are active in trying to influence. First it is discussed 
how the shape of the regulatory space in which IFAC and IAASB operates changes, due to the 
influence of major actors such as international regulators. Subsequently the relationships 
between the regulators, the big audit firms and IFAC will be analyzed. The issue of how the audit 
report change emerged on the IAASB’s agenda is also discussed. Lastly, these parts are 
integrated with the results from the comment letter analysis from the perspective of who 
influenced the regulatory space. 
7.1. The Construction of Regulatory Space  
The purpose of this thesis was to provide an understanding of the political process of changing 
the audit report and the context in which this change takes place. To understand the regulatory 
space where IFAC and IAASB have decided to make this change of the audit report it is 
important to look beyond their borders and examine other actors as well as question who is 
inside the space and involved in the regulatory process. The first research question addressed this 
by questioning who the major actors are that influence IAASB and how they are participating in 
this particular regulatory space. Therefore, the aim of this section is to discuss the audit 
regulatory space where focus is set on the international level with IFAC and its auditing 
standards board IAASB in the center of standard setting. It is within this space that issues are 
constructed as problems and appropriate responses are undertaken as part of the process.  
For a long time, the global (as well as national) auditing profession, through IFAC, was self-
regulated. However as the concept of regulatory space proposes, historical timing and crises play 
a great role in shaping the space. In 2001-2002, the Enron and WorldCom financial reporting 
scandals were revealed, followed by Parmalat in Italy in 2003, which were seen as audit failures 
causing criticism of the auditing profession’s self-regulation. A loss of confidence of financial 
information and the credibility of the auditor opinion in audit reports triggered the forming of the 
Monitoring Group over IFAC. The Monitoring Group and IFAC decided upon reforms to 
improve IFAC’s due process standard setting and the work in the public interest, to restore the 
trust in the auditing profession and audit reports. EC also put pressure or motivation for these 
due process reforms, when it stated that the mandating of ISAs in the EU could be considered if 
the standards go through a due process in the public interest. This can by the concept of 
regulatory space be explained as a crisis that interrupted the usual routine of self-regulation and 
triggered a demand for a different institutional planning. Hence the regulatory space was 
reconstructed through the entering of new major participants, like the regulators and 
organizations in the Monitoring Group and the establishment of a, from auditors, independent 
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oversight body PIOB. As the space changed, the power allocation changed, where the members 
of the Monitoring Group gained more insight and influence over the standard setting process at 
the expense of the auditing profession. That being said, as will be discussed further on, the 
auditing profession is not powerless, but rather works in cooperation with others in the public 
interest. The regulatory space of standard setting can be seen as mainly divided between the audit 
profession through IFAC, international regulators and the big audit firms.  
7.2 Organizational Relationships 
When aiming to understand regulatory space and how regulation is accomplished, the 
relationships between organizations are important to consider. This can also point to who is 
inside and who outside the regulatory space. When outlining the main organizations surrounding 
IFAC, it became evident how all of these are involved in each other’s agendas. Through the 
regulatory space metaphor this can be explained by the premise that in order for regulation to be 
accomplished, cooperation between organizations is almost inevitable.  
Starting with the Monitoring Group, now consisting of BCBS, EC, IAIS, IFIAR, IOSCO and the 
World Bank, it is found that they have many connections to each other apart from forming this 
group. In Table 3 in section 5.3, the connections of mutual membership and observation are 
compiled, which shows the complexity and intertwining of the organizations. For example it can 
be seen that the EC, the World Bank and IOSCO are very involved with its fellow members of 
the IFAC Monitoring Group. Conclusions on the effects of these relationships regarding the audit 
report are difficult to draw without more insight to the meetings and conversations. Through 
being part of the Monitoring Group, these actors had much influence over IFAC during the IFAC 
reforms, which except from the creation of PIOB resulted in e.g. less IAASB members appointed 
by the audit firms in Forum of Firms and a more rigorous due process in standard-setting. The 
Monitoring Group also has a continuous dialogue with the leadership of IFAC through the IFAC 
Regulatory Liaison Group where IFAC’s activities and issues regarding audit regulation are 
discussed with also the auditing profession. Through this channel shared meanings can be 
developed regarding appropriate actions to take. However, we argue that the Monitoring Group 
bodies that also are members of IAASB’s Consultative Advisory Group (CAG), are likely to 
have more direct influence on the IAASB and its standard setting through this channel, as 
representatives of CAG attends all IAASB meetings and uses its opportunity to come with much 
input, not least on the development of the new audit report. The members of the Monitoring 
Group and a selection of members from CAG can also be seen in Table 3 in chapter 5. The 
selection consists of the organizations that were also included in the commentary analysis 
presented in the previous chapter. Apart from the opportunity to submit comment letters, these 
actors can therefore present their views to IAASB also through CAG and influence that way. 
Within the auditing regulatory space there are actors that should not be ignored, namely the 
multinational audit firms. Since these firms are both part of the standard setting as well as being 
69 
 
the regulated parties of this space, their interest in the audit report could be seen both from the 
perspective of their working practice, work load and relationship with clients, and as a struggle 
to maintain perceived legitimacy of their profession by responding to demands from 
stakeholders. The legitimacy of the auditor profession has in the past been a common topic 
where the auditors have been criticized in the aftermath of scandals and crises. Historically it 
also been shown that the large multinational firms have been involved and responded to these 
issues in the regulatory space of auditing. The communication and relations to international 
regulators started taking place due to this, leading to the interlocking relationships of today. One 
example to a response by the auditors to global critique is how the largest five audit firms in 
1999 founded the GSC, later the GPPC, to have a body that represents their interest of the 
profession and firms on an international level. The current priority issue of the body is the 
confidence in the audit report and since it also has a mission to contribute to make IFAC a 
stronger standard setter its involvement and interest in the audit report change is noticed. In 
addition to this body, the audit firms are more directly involved with IFAC through the Forum of 
Firms and its Transnational Auditors Committee in IFAC. Through these channels the big audit 
firms nominate members to the IAASB and are involved in the audit report regulation by 
providing expertise and recommendations to IAASB. That they also contribute to about a third of 
IFAC’s budget illustrates their interest, involvement and also their resources. Together they can 
be regarded a powerful and resourceful actor in the regulatory space. Despite this involvement in 
IAASB and IFAC the big audit firms are nonetheless active in responding to IAASB’s 
consultation processes, which they do as separate networks. Even with their common 
organizations and forums, the opinions and views among the firms are sometimes but not always 
aligned in the submitted comment letters. These deviating views are however detailed issues and 
they all agreed on that the auditor commentary as a concept would be valuable for users.     
7.3 The Audit Report becomes a “problem” 
During the last two decades, the international auditing standards of IAASB grew in significance. 
The FSB and World Bank had already marked them as important for financial stability, the EU 
had implied a possible adoption, and after the clarification of the ISAs, IOSCO also openly 
promoted their implementation. In the end of the 2000 however, the global finance crises spread, 
which sparked new criticism and demands. The crisis gave rise to requests for more transparency 
in financial reporting, and the clarified ISAs were issued in time for being implemented after 
this. However, there were also requests for auditors to provide more information, to share the 
unique insights they have in their clients’ businesses. The increasingly complex world of 
financial reporting and international business, hence were circumstances to which the audit 
report must keep up and adjust. As the history of the audit report over the last century has shown, 
many earlier changes attempted to address an expectation gap while the focus now had changed 
to an information gap. The demand and expectation of the audit report of the participants in the 
regulatory space had increased, due to changes in the financial reporting context in which the 
audit report has an important function. The audit report of IAASB’s predecessor and the audit 
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report in the US were very similar, and an explanation to that can be the dominance of the big 
audit firms in both of these standard setters. The concern was therefore directed to both these 
audit reports.  
The US Department of Treasury (ACAP, 2008) recommended PCAOB to initiate an audit report 
project, while acknowledging the perceived shortcomings of the standard audit report and stating 
a belief that improving it would provide investors with more relevant information. IOSCO 
(IOSCO Technical Committee, 2009) published a report on exploring improvements to auditor 
communications discussing the perceived disadvantages with the current audit report and 
displaying IOSCO’s interest in the issue. Additionally, the EC (2010) in its Green paper wanted 
to take a leading position in a debate on the role of auditors due to questioning of how auditors 
could give unqualified audit reports to banks soon before they failed. These actors had collected 
input from various stakeholders and can from the lens of regulatory space be seen as participants 
in the space initiating a regulatory conversation about the usefulness of the audit report. Similar 
to how Young (1994) found that participants in the regulatory space around FASB constructed 
accounting issues as problems, the IOSCO, EC and the US Department of Treasury participated 
in constructing the issue of audit reporting as a problem. The IAASB responded in order to 
develop an appropriate solution to meet the expectations of the other participants in the space. 
After all, a priority mission of IFAC is the worldwide use of ISAs, and to achieve this it is 
necessary to respond international organizations, such as IOSCO and the EC. These can be seen 
as important for this mission since they have power over their members and can recommend or 
mandate the use of ISAs. From a regulatory space perspective they can be seen as having the 
“right resources” for dominating the space. By ordering studies on the topic and subsequently 
issuing a consultation paper, the IAASB subsequently took improving the auditor report as a 
project on its agenda.  
7.4 Stakeholder Influence on the Proposed New Audit Report  
The second research question in this thesis asks if it is possible to see whether some actors are 
more successful than others in influencing the rules to the new audit report. By successfully 
influencing it is meant that the respondents’ comments are incorporated into IAASB’s proposals. 
In the coming sections the results from the comment letter study is analyzed. Looking at this 
from the theoretical lens of regulatory space, the responses of comment letters can be viewed as 
attempts of trying to occupy and influence the space. By submitting comments, actors struggle 
for their opinions and their benefits and compete for space. The power of those participants may 
determine how successful they are in their struggle. Major actors were previously identified and 
discussed regarding their roles in the regulatory space. They both had past roles in shaping the 
current the regulatory space as well as initiating a regulatory conversation regarding the audit 
report. It can be anticipated that these actors have more influence on the proposed rules than 
others, or that their views are already aligned and established within IAASB. However, it will be 
further argued that such a distinction is not easy to make.   
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As part of serving the public interest and fulfilling the expectations the major and minor 
participants in the regulatory space have, the IAASB encourages stakeholders to, comment on 
proposals. As discussed in the Methodology chapter, comment letters are considered a powerful 
way to lobby. IAASB’s Consultation Paper (CP) and Invitation to Comment (ITC) had similar 
approaches where the proposals to enhance the audit report and to serve the public interest were 
discussed with both already identified concerns and suggested benefits. In many cases therefore 
the comment letters’ content reflected and confirmed these thoughts. In the CP different 
suggestions to improve the audit report were mentioned and many responses to the CP confirmed 
the need to explore how the audit report could be improved in order to narrow the perceived 
expectation gap and information gap. Due to this “confirmation”, the suggested approach could 
be interpreted as an appropriate solution to the constructed problem by the participants in the 
regulatory space even if some respondents were not of the view that an expanded auditor 
commentary was the right solution. 
 
7.4.1 The Actors’ Overall Influence on the New Audit Report Section 
As the empirical data in chapter 6 showed, there were various opinions on IAASB’s proposal of 
an Auditor Commentary, subsequently called Key Audit Matters, in the audit report. In some of 
the stakeholders groups more similar opinions could be found while in others the opinions 
differed. Some of the respondents strongly disagreed with or did not support the Audit 
Commentary concept, which requires the auditor to disclose additional information of the audit 
and the audited financial statements. These were from the thesis sample the group of preparers, 
Baker Tilly, the World Bank, IOSCO, AICD, AGNZ and CAASB. Except from the preparers it 
is difficult to draw conclusions about the disagreement of the concept in connection to a 
categorized stakeholder group. Worth noting is that neither the World Bank or IOSCO, which are 
found to be very integrated within IFAC and IAASB , through e.g. CAG and Monitoring Group, 
agrees with the approach taken. These major actors were found to question the value of the 
proposed Auditor Commentary and be concerned that it would be too complex for users’ to 
comprehend. 
From a broad and general perspective of the regulatory space metaphor, the actors that did not 
support the concept could be seen as “excluded” from the space when it comes to the issue of 
Key Audit Matters. This since IAASB decided, against their struggles, to move on with the 
concept and develop a new standard and section for it in the proposed audit report. However, it is 
not that easy and appropriate to think of them as excluded without further consideration, only 
because they did not support the concept in the examined comment letters. For example, they can 
have influenced the process in other ways, between the public consultations. To explicitly say 
that the actors not supporting the Auditor Commentary as presented in the CP and ITC therefore 
are excluded from regulatory space, is not appropriate. In the case of the specific respondents 
mentioned, i.e. preparers, IOSCO World Bank and Baker Tilly, it could be said that as far as the 
ED goes, their overall opinions did not get through. It is also not considered likely that the 
direction taken by IAASB will change substantially when finalizing the new standard.  
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In contrast to the preparers and the other disagreeing actors, generally supportive opinions 
among the investors were found. The investors and analysts, as users of the audit report, can 
from the lens of regulatory space be seen as actors that directly benefit from this regulation. Also 
national standard setters, such as ASB, NAOS and CNAO, the member body ACCA and the 
smaller audit networks of Mazars and SRA were very positive. By looking at Table 6 a tempting 
conclusion to make could be that investors and those other actors were “listened to” by IAASB 
and successful in their attempts to influence the audit report, since the IAASB decided to proceed 
with the approach that these actors approved on. The level of detail and ambiguity that comes 
with the Audit Commentary and the corresponding Key Audit Matters, suggest however that 
such conclusion cannot be made. It can be said these actors were successful in terms of that their 
views were in line with the proposals of IAASB.  
It can be noted that the rationale for change came from the purpose of providing users, especially 
investors and analysts, with better information and therefore what these actors consider useful is 
particularly interesting for the IAASB. The group of investors and analysts however also had 
some concerns. A difference compared to the preparers, who didn’t approve of the concept of 
Auditor Commentary at all, was that the concerns were rather used to highlight the areas they 
found important for IAASB to consider to make the Auditor Commentary useful. Much of these 
concerns and suggestions can be noticed in the proposed Key Audit Matters but not all of the 
points that the investors requested are incorporated. By their comment letters and suggestions it 
could be seen that the actors both wanted to be a part of the regulatory space and tried to 
influence IAASB with information they believed is important for the auditors to provide.  
All of the respondents categorized as the auditing profession more or less supported the 
provision of an Auditor Commentary, except for Baker Tilly. Holding in mind that these actors 
are directly affected by the proposal of Auditor Commentary, as they are the regulated ones, it is 
clear in their comment letters how they try to influence and be a part of this space. Just as 
investors were seen as beneficials of this regulation, it is presumed that it is in the interest of 
auditors’ to promote satisfying solution for users, for the sake of the perceived usefulness of their 
auditing profession. As opposed to the investors that promoted disclosure of various information 
concerning the audit, the Big Four for instance marked that they only thought it appropriate to 
base the commentary on highlighting matters of the financial statements. The IAASB however 
changed the objective of Audit Commentary from focusing partly on users’ understanding of 
financial statements, to having its basis taken from matters significant in the audit. Still, the 
proposed rules are principle based and what to disclose about each key audit matter is up to the 
judgment of the auditor. This principle-based approach allows flexibility for the auditor and 
could be an effect of the raised concerns from the profession about the difficulties in providing a 
fair insight into the complex audit procedures and that the costs and efforts should not outweigh 
the benefits. 
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7.4.2 The Actors’ Influence on Certain Issues 
Two tables are presented below. The first one, Table 11 is a compilation of the four tables from 
the previous chapter, and the second one, Table 12 represents the issue for which entities the new 
section of the audit report should be required. Both tables aim to show how some of the 
participants in the regulatory space were successful or not successful in getting their opinion 
incorporated into the ED of the new audit report standards. It can be stressed again that this is a 
selection of issues, based on important features of the new rules but also based on the 
circumstance that it is possible to determine if they are incorporated in the ED at all. This was 
not always the case due to the ambiguity of the discussed matters and proposed rules. When 
actors are situated in the red columns it indicates that their view on the matter was the opposite 
of the view presented by IAASB in its final draft.  
 
Within this selection of issues connected to the new rules of Key Audit Matters in the audit 
report, it is shown difficult to conclude if one respondent category is more successful than 
another. It could also be worth to consider alternative groupings to make sense of the results. 
One such grouping could include the actors that were found to be closely involved with IAASB 
and IFAC in its formal structure, i.e. the major actors in the regulatory space. These groups were 
the big audit firms and international regulators. For example, the Big Four audit firms are 
relatively often represented in the green columns of the figure, together with Mazars, which 
points towards that (1) they suggested approaches in their comment letters to CP and ITC, which 
the IAASB later incorporated into the ED and/or (2) that they agreed with IAASB’s approach on 
issues, with which IAASB continued to proceed or more importantly (3) they are involved within 
IAASB and therefore IAASB’s proposals already take into account many of their opinions. Other 
so called “insiders” are not as represented in these tables as the audit firms. IOSCO together with 
other regulators, member bodies and audit firms agreed that Emphasis of Matter should be kept, 
which also IAASB changed its proposal into. Baker Tilly on the other hand was not as successful 
in gaining results for its suggestions. In the terms of regulatory space it could be expressed as 
Baker Tilly is a less powerful actor within the space. However, it could also be that for example 
Baker Tilly has deviating opinions from the majority of the respondents, and that IAASB want to 
proceed with the requests of the majority. In three of the four issues in the table, the IAASB’s 
ED was aligned with the views of the majority of respondents from our selection that had 
commented on the specific issues in question. Regarding the question of requiring disclosures on 
materiality, it could however be interpreted that CNRL, Mazars, Deloitte, KPMG and BlackRock 
even as a minority convinced IAASB that such an approach was not appropriate. However 
without the full selection of respondents, such a conclusion cannot be made. Also regarding the 
issue of for which entities the Auditor Commentary should be required, the majority of our 
selection did not convince the IAASB. As the board mentions itself, it listened to the argument of 
that a definition of PIEs needed to be considered, and subsequently concluded that the new 
standard should be tested first before mandating it to further entities than listed entities.   
74 
 
Table 11: Compilation of Identified Issues 
 
Table 12: Requirement of Auditor Commentary   
 
Listed entities All entities PIEs or Other
Preparers CNRL BusinessEurope
Profession KPMG, EY, PwC Mazars
Deloitte, SRA, Baker 
Tilly
Regulators and 
oversight bodies
IAIS BCBS, ESMA
TCWG IIA OECD, AICD
Investors and 
analysts
HEOS, EUMEDION S&P BlackRock, ICGN
Member Bodies and 
Other Professional 
Organizations
ICAEW, IDW ACCA
ICAN, ICPAS, 
EFAA, FEE
NSS and Public 
Sector organizations
ASB, JICPA
UK FRC, CAASB, 
AGNZ, NAOS
For which entities Auditor Commentary should be required
Yes No Yes No
Preparers Preparers
Group of 100 A, 100 
Group UK
CNRL
Profession PwC, Mazars, SRA Profession Baker Tilly
Mazars, Deloitte, 
KPMG
Regulators and 
oversight bodies
IOSCO, IRBA, ESMA IAIS
Regulators and 
oversight bodies
EAIG, ESMA
TCWG TCWG
Investors and analysts EUMEDION, ICGN Investors and analysts
HEOS, EUMEDION, 
ICGN
BlackRock
Member Bodies and 
Other Professional 
Organizations
ACCA, EFAA, FEE, 
ICAEW
JICPA
Member Bodies and 
Other Professional 
Organizations
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
UK FRC
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
UK FRC
Positive Negative Yes No
Preparers Preparers
Profession KPMG, EY, Mazars Baker Tilly Profession
Deloitte, EY, 
Mazars, SRA
Baker Tilly, PwC
Regulators and 
oversight bodies
Regulators and 
oversight bodies
TCWG TCWG AICD
Investors and analysts HEOS, EUMEDION Investors and analysts HEOS S&P
Member Bodies and 
Other Professional 
Organizations
ACCA, IDW CAQ
Member Bodies and 
Other Professional 
Organizations
ICPAS, ACCA, 
EFAA, FEE
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
CAASB
NSS and Public Sector 
organizations
ICAN, UK FRC
Emphasis of Matter and Other Matter paragraphs should 
be kept even though Auditor Commentary is introduced
Whether information about applied materiality should be 
included in Auditor Commentary
Disclosing information                                                      
about matters communicated with TCWG
Auditor Commentary voluntary for other audits
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As noticed in chapter 6, Deloitte displays an example of how an opinion changed throughout 
IAASB’s consultation process. In its CP response, it was a strong promoter for a uniform and 
consistent audit report for all entities, while in the ITC, it agreed with IAASB in only mandating 
Auditor Commentary for certain entities. From the lens of regulatory space, this can be seen as 
how shared meanings are developed through regulatory conversations and how interests are 
constructed and reconstructed depending on the situation, which in Deloittes case was tougher 
rules which is considered only appropriate to mandate for certain audits.   
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter the most relevant points from the empirical data has been analyzed by the 
application of the regulatory space concept. The main points will be further presented in the next 
chapter of Conclusions.  
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8. Conclusions   
This thesis has considered the context in which the political process of changing IAASB’s 
standard audit report takes place. When considering the circumstances around which the audit 
report has changed in the past and is changing today, it is argued that IFAC and IAASB are 
involved with and influenced by a number of global actors. Using the chosen theoretical 
framework, these actors can be called major or important occupants of the regulatory space. 
Many of these are part of a grouping consisting of international regulators, such as in particular 
IOSCO, the World Bank, IFIAR, BCBS, FSB, IAIS and the EC. By forming the Monitoring 
Group to oversee IFAC, they evaluate and influence its activities to make sure IFAC works in 
the public interest. In addition, the Monitoring Group appoints members and conduct oversight 
over PIOB, which in turn oversees the IAASB to improve its standard setting in the public 
interest. This shows that the members of Monitoring Group are an important part of the 
governance structure of IFAC and IAASB. Also through a Consultative Advisory Group which 
attends IAASB’s meetings, the members of the Monitoring Group together with other 
stakeholders have an advisory role to the IAASB. Throughout the thesis it has also been argued 
that the relationships between the group of international regulators are heavily interlocking and 
that they have common goals of maintaining financial stability. In this, auditing has an important 
part.  
 
Audit firms, and especially the Big Four are also through the Forum of Firms and its committee 
in IFAC, powerful participants in the regulatory space, even if they had a stronger position of 
self-regulation before the corporate scandals of for instance Enron and the subsequent 
establishment of PIOB. Having outlined IFAC’s past it has been seen that the mentioned 
organizations took a great part in helping IFAC achieve the strong position it has today in the 
international financial infrastructure, and the widespread acceptance and use of IAASB’s 
auditing standards.  
 
All of the above mentioned actors are involved in the process of changing the standard audit 
report. The EC and IOSCO participated in constructing the issue of audit reporting as a problem 
within the regulatory space which together with request for change arising in the US helped put 
the audit report on IAASB’s agenda. The EC’s contemporary proposals for audit report change 
has also been taken into account by IAASB during theirs. All of the international regulators have 
also been involved in IAASB’s outreach activities, with the purpose of discussing and obtaining 
input on the audit report issue. In addition to this, IOSCO, the World Bank, BCBS and IAIS and 
the Big Four audit firms submitted comment letters to IAASB’s proposal presented in the 
Consultation Paper (CP) and Invitation to Comment (ITC).  
 
Throughout IAASB’s consultation process, which consisted of mainly three invitations for public 
stakeholder comments, many actors apart from the international regulators and audit firms 
mentioned above, took the opportunity to present their views and suggestions and thereby trying 
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to influence the regulatory space. Especially the proposed new requirements of the auditor 
providing an additional commentary section, later called Key Audit Matters, was discussed as it 
represents a particularly substantial change of audit practice. Some respondents from the 
selection of this thesis such as preparers, IOSCO, the World Bank and Baker Tilly rather 
disagreed with IAASB’s proposal. They considered it the wrong approach to address the 
information gap, which is said to be the reason behind this new proposed section of the audit 
report. In the light of that the IAASB continued to pursue this approach, it can be said that these 
actors were not successful in influencing this new approach in the audit report.  
 
Since the request for the auditor to provide additional information originally came from 
investors, these stakeholders can be seen as successful in this circumstance. The position of the 
investors which we examined here were also supportive of IAASB’s proposals. Some of them 
got their views on certain issues incorporated into IAASB’s proposed scope and objective of Key 
Audit Matters. As presented and discussed thoroughly in the previous chapter of analysis, many 
other actors have been successful or unsuccessful in the sense of suggesting an approach to a 
matter which is later incorporated or not incorporated into the final draft. The majority of the Big 
Four audit firms have for example “had it their way” regarding several issues, while also the 
opposite regarding other issues. From the issues that we focused upon, there are no clear patterns 
suggesting that some actors are systematically not listened to, or that the views of some are 
systematically incorporated in the final draft. It was mentioned that for instance preparers and 
Baker Tilly were not very successful in influencing the proposed rules to the issues that we 
looked upon. Apart from that, the conclusion arrived at is that we perceive it problematic to 
determine whether some actor or stakeholder group is more successful than others in influencing 
the proposed rules. This can be due to a number of reasons (some of which are discussed in 
chapter 9).  
 
One factor that increases the difficulty to in a valid way compare the opinions of actors is the 
great variety in the length of comment letters and the number of issues discussed by respondents. 
This means that the views of all respondents cannot be analyzed in comparison to IAASB’s final 
proposals or in comparison to each other. Another reason is that the opinions or suggestions 
presented in comment letters are not always clear and distinct to interpret. Many respondents 
rather raise concerns which they recommend IAASB to take into account. It is difficult to 
determine if these sometimes ambiguous concerns or principles have influenced the proposed 
rules. In summary, it can be seen that the majority of respondents has managed to get their view 
on certain issues incorporated into the scope, objective or requirements to the new audit report 
standard. It is however not possible to fairly distinguish some of them as more successful than 
others in influencing the rules. We can hence see that many actors are involved and trying to 
influence the regulatory space, but it is not clear who the most influential actors are in the 
consultation process. 
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9. Reflections 
 
By seeing the current change of IAASB’s audit report standard as part of a regulatory space, this 
thesis has outlined the roles of major actors in the construction of regulatory space and 
regulatory conversations. Through this it has contributed to a way of looking at the current 
process of changing the audit report as part of a greater context in which the participants of the 
regulatory space has influence. The conclusions have shown that a standard setting process can 
involve complex considerations. These include which direction a change should take and the 
details the change should contain. There is a myriad of different interests and opinions a standard 
setter needs to consider and not all wishes can be fulfilled.  
 
The concept of regulatory space has been used through this thesis as both a guidance to approach 
the research purpose as well as a tool for analyzing the empirical data. Some advantages and 
disadvantages have appeared with the chosen theoretical framework. In chapter 3 it was pointed 
out how this theory is considered useful for analyzing changes to rules within an existing 
regulatory arena. The use of the “lens” of regulatory space was a helpful analytical tool for 
organizing and explaining the findings of the empirical data. Similar to the limitations of making 
a case study (Ryan, Scapens & Theobald, 2002) we found that with the concept of regulatory 
space it can be difficult to draw boundaries for what to include in the scope of the research, i.e. to 
limit the regulatory space. The regulatory space involves studying the context in which 
regulation occurs and the relationships between participants, but there are no clear boundaries or 
guidance for how far the researcher should go in outlining the regulatory space. This aspect in 
turn led to this thesis having some limitations. 
 
This thesis focused on the organizational relationships and participation of a group of global 
organizations, audit firms and regulators as the main boundaries and scope for deeper 
examination. In addition, the comment letters of a selection of other major and minor 
stakeholders to IAASB were examined to try and distinguish their influence on a particular 
standard changing process. If different boundaries had been set and a wider focused used, it 
could have led to broader insights into the regulatory space. Therefore it would be interesting for 
further research to adopt an even wider lens or to deeper examine the organizational 
relationships.  
 
By doing this, other important participants of the space could possibly be captured and results of 
more informal influence could be analyzed. Another suggestion for further research is to do a 
similar study of the audit report change of the IAASB but when the rules are finalized. In such a 
study it would likely be easier to see patterns of influential actors, both since the issues of 
discussions are more clear and defined, and since the whole process from the beginning to the 
end can be examined. A quantitative approach for analyzing comment letters could be taken, in 
order to systematically code and sort opinions and arguments and compare to the final standards.  
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Appendix 1. Investigated Issues in Comment Letters 
 
 
1. The proposal of a new section of an Auditor Commentary 
- The general opinion about the proposal about an Auditor Commentary 
- Support for audit commentary about the audit and the audited entity 
- Support for audit commentary on the audit procedures 
- Other suggestions to improve the auditor report 
 
2.  Emphasis of Matter and Other Matter paragraphs 
- Support for an expanded use of these paragraphs 
- Support for the Auditor Commentary to replace these paragraphs 
- Support for these paragraphs to be retained even though the introduction of Auditor 
Commentary  
 
3. Opinions regarding which entities the proposed Auditor Commentary should be 
required for and if it should be voluntary for the entities that it is not required for. 
 
4. Expressed views regarding information about applied materiality should be included or 
not in the Auditor Commentary. 
 
5. Expressed views if disclosures in the Auditor Commentary should be matters that have 
been communicated with Those Charge With Governance. 
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Appendix 2. The Selected Sample of Respondents
 
Abbreviations Name CP ITC
Investors and Analysts
BR BlackRock, Inc (Investment Manager) 1 1
EUMEDION Eumedion (Dutch Institutional Investors) 1 1
HEOS Hermes Equity Ownership Services 1 1
S&P Standard & Poor's Ratings Services 0 1
ICGN International Corporate Governance Network 1 1
Preparers of Financial 
Statements
BusinessEurope BusinessEurope 0 1
100 Group UK The Hundred Group of Finance Directors (UK) 1 1
CNRL Canadian Natural Resources Limited 1 1
Group of 100 A Group of 100 (Australia) 0 1
Regulators and Oversight 
Authorities
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1 1
ESMA* European Securities and Markets Authority 1 1
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 1 1
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors 1 1
EAIG
European Audit Inspection Group (21 European Audit 
Regulators)17
0 1
World Bank World Bank 0 1
Profession
Deloitte Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited 1 1
EY Ernst & Young Global 1 1
KPMG KPMG IFRG Limited 1 1
PWC PwC 1 1
Mazars Mazars 1 1
SRA SRA (Netherlands Network) 0 1
BT Baker Tilly 1 1
TCWG
IIA Institute of Internal Auditors 1 1
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 0 1
AICD Australian Institute of Company Directors 1 1
National Auditing Standard 
Setters
UK FRC* Financial Reporting Council – UK 0 1
ASB
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Auditing 
Standards Board
0 1
CAASB Canadian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 1 1
JICPA Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1 1
Member Bodies and Other 
Professional Organizations
FEE* Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens 1 1
EFAA European Federation of Accountants and Auditors for SMEs 1 1
IDW* Institut der Wirtschaftsprufer 0 1
ACCA* Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 1 1
ICAEW* Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 1 1
ICPAS Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore 0 1
CAQ* Center for Audit Quality 1 1
ZICA Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants 1 1
ICAN Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 0 1
Public Sector Organizations
CNAO National Audit Office (China) 0 1
AGNZ Office of the Controller and Auditor-General of New Zealand 1 1
NAOS National Audit Office (Sweden 0 1
27 41
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Appendix 3. The Independent Audit Report Issued 1994 
 
 
Auditor’s Report 
 
(Appropriate Addressee) 
 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of the ABC Company as of December 31, 
19X1, and the related statements of income, and cash flows for the year then ended. 
These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company’s management. Our 
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit. 
 
We conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on Auditing (or refer 
to relevant national standards or practices). Those Standards require that we plan and perform the 
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial 
statement presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements give a true and fair view of (or ‘present fairly, in 
all material respects,’) the financial position of the Company as of December 31, 19X1, and of 
the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with ...’ (and 
comply with ...). 
 
Auditor 
Date 
Address 
 
Source: FEE, 2000, p. 12,   
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Appendix 4. The Current Independent Audit Report, ISA 700 
 
INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT  
[Appropriate Addressee]  
 
Report on the Financial Statements  
We have audited the accompanying financial statements of ABC Company, which comprise the statement 
of financial position as at December 31, 20X1, and the statement of comprehensive income, statement of 
changes in equity and statement of cash flows for the year then ended, and a summary of significant 
accounting policies and other explanatory information.  
Management’s Responsibility for the Financial Statements  
Management is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these financial statements in 
accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, and for such internal control as 
management determines is necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from 
material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.  
Auditor’s Responsibility  
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit. We 
conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on Auditing. Those standards require that 
we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about 
whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement.  
An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts and disclosures in 
the financial statements. The procedures selected depend on the auditor’s judgment, including the 
assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to fraud or error. 
In making those risk assessments, the auditor considers internal control relevant to the entity’s preparation 
and fair presentation of the financial statements in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in 
the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the entity’s 
internal control. An audit also includes evaluating the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the 
reasonableness of accounting estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall 
presentation of the financial statements.  
We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for 
our audit opinion.  
Opinion  
In our opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, (or give a true and fair view 
of) the financial position of ABC Company as at December 31, 20X1, and (of) its financial performance 
and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards.  
Report on Other Legal and Regulatory Requirements  
[Form and content of this section will vary depending on the nature of the other reporting 
responsibilities.]  
 
[Auditor’s signature]  
[Date of the auditor’s report]  
[Auditor’s address]
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Appendix 5. Member Organizations of IAASB’s Consultative Advisory Group (CAG) 
 Asian Financial Executives Institutes 
 Associação Brasileira de Instituições Financeiras de Desenvolvimento 
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 BUSINESSEUROPE 
 CFA Institute 
 European Commission 
 European Federation of Accountants and Auditors for SMEs 
 European Financial Executives Institutes 
 Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens 
 Gulf States Regulatory Authorities 
 Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
 Institute of Internal Auditors 
 International Accounting Standards Board 
 International Actuarial Association 
 International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
 International Bar Association 
 International Corporate Governance Network 
 International Organization of Securities Commissions 
 International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 
 International Valuation Standards Council 
 Islamic Financial Services Board 
 Japan Securities Dealers Association 
 National Association of State Boards of Accountancy 
 North American Financial Executives Institutes 
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring Board 
 United Nations Conference on Trade & Development 
 World Bank 
 World Federation of Exchanges 
Observers 
 Financial Services Agency, Japan 
 International Monetary Fund 
 U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IFAC, 2014q
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Appendix 6. The Proposed Illustrative Audit Report 
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